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COPYRIGHT AND PUBLIC GOOD ECONOMICS:   
A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 
CHRISTOPHER S. YOO†
The conventional approach to analyzing the economics of copyright is 
based on the premise that copyrightable works constitute pure public goods, 
which is generally modeled by assuming that such works are nonexcludable and 
that the marginal cost of making additional copies of them is essentially zero.  
These assumptions in turn imply that markets systematically produce too few 
copyrightable works and underutilize those that are produced.  In this Article, 
Professor Christopher Yoo argues that the conventional approach is based on a 
fundamental misunderstanding.  A close examination of the foundational lit-
erature on public good economics reveals that the defining characteristic of pub-
lic goods is the need to satisfy an optimality criterion known as the “Samuelson 
condition,” which suggests that the systematic bias toward underproduction is 
the result of the inability to induce consumers to reveal their preferences rather 
than nonexcludability and zero marginal cost.  Reframing the analysis in terms 
of the Samuelson condition also expands the number of ways in which the as-
sumptions underlying pure public goods can be relaxed.  In so doing, it sug-
gests that markets for copyrighted works are more properly analyzed as impure 
public goods.  Unlike markets for pure public goods, markets for impure public 
goods exhibit no systematic bias toward underproduction and are not bounded 
away from providing efficient levels of utilization.  The insights of impure pub-
lic goods theory thus have broad implications for a wide range of copyright-
related issues, including fair use, duration, compulsory licenses, database pro-
tection, digital rights management, and derivative works.
†  Professor of Law and Director of the Technology and Entertainment Law Pro-
gram, Vanderbilt University Law School.  I would like to thank participants at work-
shops conducted at the University of Michigan Law School and the Vanderbilt Univer-
sity Law School, as well as John Conley, Andy Daughety, Paul Edelman, Gerry 
Faulhaber, James Gibson, Paul Heald, Bob Inman, Mark Lemley, Glynn Lunney, Kris-
ten Madison, Ted Parsons, Adam Pritchard, Bob Rasmussen, Jennifer Reinganum, 
Chris Sanchirico, Polk Wagner, and Joel Waldfogel, for comments on earlier drafts of 
this Article, and Catherine Sloan and Daniel Burks-Goodman for their research assis-
tance.  Financial support from the Vanderbilt Dean’s Fund is gratefully acknowledged.  
All errors are my responsibility. 
636 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 635
INTRODUCTION......................................................................................637
I.  THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO APPLYING PUBLIC GOOD
ECONOMICS TO COPYRIGHT ............................................................643
A.  Nonexcludability.............................................................................644
B. Nonrivalry as Zero Marginal Cost ...................................................645
C. Applications of the Conventional Approach to Specific Copyright 
Doctrines ........................................................................................650
1.   Fair Use.....................................................................................650
2.   Duration ...................................................................................652
3.   Compulsory Licenses ...............................................................653
4.   Database Protection .................................................................654
5.   Digital Rights Management .....................................................655
6.   Derivative Uses .........................................................................656
D.  The Analytical Shortcomings of the Conventional Approach..............659
II.  THE SAMUELSON CONDITION AS THE TRUE FOUNDATION OF  
PUBLIC GOOD ECONOMICS..............................................................662
A.  The Baseline Case of Private Goods..................................................662
B. Pure Public Goods ..........................................................................665
C. Critique of the Conventional Approach.............................................671
1.   A New Perspective on Nonexcludability .................................671
2.   A New Perspective on Nonrivalry as Zero Marginal Cost .......672
3.   The Proper Scope of Price Discrimination.............................673
III. THE THEORY OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS ........................................675
A.  The Economics of Congestion ...........................................................678
1.   A Basic Description of the Economics of Congestion ............678
2.   The Applicability to Copyright ................................................683
B. Spatial Competition ........................................................................687
1.   A Basic Description of Spatial Competition............................688
2.   The Policy Implications of Spatial Competition for  
Copyright..................................................................................693
a. The Feasibility of Promoting Optimal Access...............................693
b. The Feasibility of Optimal Incentives .........................................696
3.   Potential Limitations to Spatial Competition .........................704
IV.  THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING IMPURE  PUBLIC GOODS
THEORY TO COPYRIGHT...................................................................706
A.  Fair Use .........................................................................................707
B. Duration ........................................................................................708
C. Compulsory Licenses .......................................................................709
D.  Database Protection.........................................................................710
E.   Digital Rights Management ............................................................711
F.   Derivative Uses ...............................................................................711
CONCLUSION..........................................................................................714
2007] COPYRIGHT AND PUBLIC GOOD ECONOMICS 637
INTRODUCTION
Scholarship on the economics of copyright has been dominated 
by the assumption that copyrightable works are pure public goods.1
The most frequently cited definition of pure public goods focuses on 
two characteristics.  First, pure public goods are nonexcludable, in that 
producers cannot provide their benefits to one consumer without si-
multaneously providing the benefits to other consumers.  Second, 
pure public goods are nonrival, in that the consumption of the good 
by one consumer does not reduce the supply available for consump-
tion by others.2  Nonrivalry is generally modeled by assuming that the 
marginal cost of making an additional copy of a copyrightable work is 
zero.3  These assumptions imply that markets provide insufficient in-
1 See Ben Depoorter & Francesco Parisi, Fair Use and Copyright Protection:  A Price 
Theory Explanation, 21 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 453, 465 n.4 (2002) (calling the assump-
tion that copyright is a pure public good “part of the collective wisdom of mainstream 
economic analysis”).  For the seminal statement tying intellectual property to the the-
ory of pure public goods, see Kenneth J. Arrow, Economic Welfare and the Allocation of 
Resources for Invention, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC 
AND SOCIAL FACTORS 609, 614-16 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research ed., 1962).  For 
leading examples within the copyright literature, see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case 
for Copyright:  A Study of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV.
L. REV. 281, 281 (1970); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 101 
HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1700-05 (1988); Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:  A 
Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L.
REV. 1600, 1610-11 (1982); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analy-
sis of Copyright Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989); Mark A. Lemley, The Economics 
of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 TEX. L. REV. 989, 994-99 (1997).  For over-
views of the economics of pure public goods, see RICHARD CORNES & TODD SANDLER,
THE THEORY OF EXTERNALITIES, PUBLIC GOODS, AND CLUB GOODS 143-239 (2d ed. 
1996); William H. Oakland, Theory of Public Goods, in 2 HANDBOOK OF PUBLIC ECONOM-
ICS 485, 486-99, 502-22 (Alan J. Auerbach & Martin Feldstein eds., 1987). 
 Of course, a wide range of noneconomic justifications for copyright also exist.  See 
generally William Fisher, Theories of Intellectual Property, in NEW ESSAYS IN THE LEGAL AND 
POLITICAL THEORY OF PROPERTY 168, 170-73, 184-94 (Stephen R. Munzer ed., 2001).  I 
leave extended discussion of copyright’s noneconomic aspects to other work.  See
Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Democracy:  A Cautionary Note, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1933, 
1953-63 (2000) (critiquing democratic theories of copyright). 
2 See R.A. Musgrave, Provision for Social Goods, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS: AN ANALYSIS 
OF PUBLIC PRODUCTION AND CONSUMPTION AND THEIR RELATIONS TO THE PRIVATE 
SECTORS 124, 126-29 (Julius Margolis & Henri Guitton eds., 1969). 
3 For illustrative examples, see Yochai Benkler, An Unhurried View of Private Order-
ing in Information Transactions, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2063, 2066, 2070, 2078 (2000); James 
Boyle, Cruel, Mean, or Lavish?  Economic Analysis, Price Discrimination and Digital Intellec-
tual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 2007, 2013 (2000); Timothy J. Brennan, Copyright, Prop-
erty, and the Right To Deny, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 675, 698 (1993); Mark A. Lemley, Prop-
erty, Intellectual Property, and Free Riding, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1031, 1053-54 (2005); Neil 
Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 292 
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centives to produce copyrightable works and provide insufficient ac-
cess to those works that are produced. They also imply that any at-
tempt to alleviate the problems of underproduction necessarily wors-
ens the problems of underutilization and vice versa.  The 
conventional approach thus frames copyright as a tradeoff between 
access and incentives that is necessarily second best in both dimen-
sions.4
In my prior work, I have critiqued the conventional approach, fo-
cusing on how product differentiation can mitigate these economic 
problems.5  In this Article, I extend my critique by returning to the 
fundamental economic characteristics of pure public goods first iden-
tified by Paul Samuelson.  Interestingly, Samuelson did not regard ei-
ther nonexcludability or zero marginal cost as the distinctive charac-
teristic of pure public goods.6  Instead, Samuelson focused on another 
feature:  the fact that the same quantity of production can appear as 
an argument in more than one person’s consumption function.7  In-
deed, each person who purchases the public good simultaneously 
consumes the entire output of the public good.8  This characteristic 
gives rise to an interesting inversion of the conditions for the efficient 
allocation of private goods.  For private goods, consumers pay the same 
(1996).  Other commentators assume that marginal cost is nonzero, but constant.  E.g.,
Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 326-27, 333.  Relaxing the strict assumption of zero 
marginal cost in this manner does not materially affect the analysis. 
4 See, e.g., Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984) (describing copyright as requiring “a difficult balance between the interests of 
authors and inventors in the control and exploitation of their writings and discoveries 
on the one hand, and society’s competing interest in the free flow of ideas, informa-
tion, and commerce on the other hand”); Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 326 
(“Striking the correct balance between access and incentives is the central problem in 
copyright law.”). 
5 Christopher S. Yoo, Copyright and Product Differentiation, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 212 
(2004).
6 See Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 387 (1954) [hereinafter Samuelson, Pure Theory].  Indeed, Samuelson only noted 
the pricing problems posed by declining average cost as an afterthought.  See Paul A. 
Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition of a Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 350, 356 (1955) [hereinafter Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition] (“I believe I 
did not go far enough in claiming for [my theoretical model] relevance to the vast 
area of decreasing costs that constitutes an important part of economic reality . . . . I 
must leave to future research discussion of these vital issues.”). 
7 Paul A. Samuelson, Aspects of Public Expenditure Theories, 40 REV. ECON. & STAT.
332, 334 (1958) [hereinafter Samuelson, Aspects] (noting that public goods “simultane-
ously enter into many persons’ indifference curves”). 
8 Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition, supra note 6, at 350; Samuelson, Pure Theory,
supra note 6, at 387. 
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price and signal the different valuations that they place on the good by 
purchasing different quantities.  For pure public goods, consumers con-
sume the same quantity of production and signal the intensity of their 
preferences by their willingness to pay different prices.
This characteristic dictates that optimal production of public 
goods requires satisfying the “Samuelson condition,” which is gener-
ally recognized as the key feature distinguishing public goods from 
private goods.9  The Samuelson condition requires expanding the 
production of public goods so long as the aggregate marginal benefits 
derived by all consumers exceeds the marginal cost of increasing pro-
duction of those goods.  The problem is that when consumers express 
the intensity of their preferences through prices rather than quanti-
ties, there is no way to induce consumers to reveal their marginal 
valuations.  On the contrary, the fact that the same quantity can ap-
pear as an argument in more than one person’s consumption func-
tion gives consumers the incentive to understate the value they place 
on the public good in the hopes that other consumers will bear a lar-
ger proportion of the first-copy costs. 
The absence of any reliable way to determine the aggregate mar-
ginal value that consumers place on a public good makes it all but im-
possible to determine the optimal level of production for any public 
good.10  As Samuelson himself noted, this problem of incentive in-
compatibility would remain even if the problems associated with non-
excludability and nonmarginal cost pricing were somehow solved.11
Although scholars have proposed a number of ingenious methods for 
inducing consumers to reveal their true demands,12 all of these meth-
ods suffer from shortcomings and limitations of their own.13
9 See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 23-24 (describing how the Samuelson 
condition distinguishes public and private goods); Oakland, supra note 1, at 489 (call-
ing the Samuelson condition “novel”).  Indeed, Samuelson himself regarded the for-
mulation of this condition  as his primary contribution to the study of public goods.  
See Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 6, at 388 (defining the condition and calling it 
the “new element” that serves as the basis for his “pure theory of government expendi-
ture on collective consumption goods”). 
10 Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 6, at 388-89; accord Samuelson, Diagrammatic
Exposition, supra note 6, at 355 (noting the difficulty of getting consumers to reveal 
their preferences for pure public goods so that optimal production can be deter-
mined); Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 334 (same). 
11 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 335-36. 
12 For examples of such systems, see Edward H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public 
Goods, 11 PUB. CHOICE 17 (1971); Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, Optimal Allocation 
of Public Goods:  A Solution to the “Free Rider” Problem, 45 ECONOMETRICA 783 (1977); 
Theodore Groves & Martin Loeb, Incentives and Public Inputs, 4 J. PUB. ECON. 211 
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Reframing the problem posed by pure public goods in terms of 
preference revelation and the incentive incompatibility implicit in the 
Samuelson condition, instead of nonexcludability and zero marginal 
cost, not only recharacterizes the fundamental policy problems posed 
by the economics of copyright.  It also suggests new solutions.  From 
the very beginning, critics have pointed out that private goods and 
pure public goods represent polar cases and that many, if not most, 
goods fall somewhere in between these two extremes.14  Samuelson 
himself recognized the existence of such intermediate cases, but ques-
tioned the tractability of the problems they posed.15
Notwithstanding Samuelson’s pessimism about the likely fruitful-
ness of the enterprise, a major literature has emerged exploring “im-
pure public goods.”16  The best-developed literature on impure public 
goods focuses on the economics of congestion, derived largely from 
Charles Tiebout’s work on “local public goods” and James Buchanan’s 
pioneering work on “club goods.”17  Although congestion costs are 
sometimes described as reintroducing a degree of rivalry, they do not 
in fact prevent the same quantity of production from appearing as an 
argument in more than one person’s consumption function.  Put an-
other way, optimal production of impure public goods must still satisfy 
the Samuelson condition. 
(1975); William Vickrey, Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J.
FIN. 8 (1961).  For earlier solutions that predate the formalization of public good eco-
nomics, see Erik Lindahl, Just Taxation—A Positive Solution (1919), reprinted in CLASSICS 
IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 168 (Richard A. Musgrave & Alan T. Peacock eds., 
Elizabeth Henderson trans., 1958); Knut Wicksell, A New Principle of Just Taxation
(1896), reprinted in CLASSICS IN THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE, supra, at 72 (J.M. Bu-
chanan trans.). 
13 For surveys of this literature, see CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 198-239; 
Jean-Jacques Laffont, Incentives and the Allocation of Public Goods, in HANDBOOK OF PUB-
LIC ECONOMICS, supra note 1, at 537, 554-66; Oakland, supra note 1, at 522-30. 
14 See, e.g., Stephen Enke, More on the Misuse of Mathematics in Economics:  A Rejoin-
der, 37 REV. ECON. & STAT. 131, 132 (1955) (noting the existence of a large number of 
intermediate goods that do not fit into Samuelson’s theory); Julius Margolis, A Com-
ment on the Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 37 REV. ECON & STAT. 347, 347-48 (1955) 
(observing that governments provide many goods that do not conform to Samuelson’s 
strict definition). 
15 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 335-36. 
16 For surveys of the literature on impure public goods, see CORNES & SANDLER,
supra note 1, at 255-72, 347-479; Oakland, supra note 1, at 499-509. 
17 James M. Buchanan, An Economic Theory of Clubs, 32 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 1, 2 
(1965); Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956).  For an overview of this literature and an application of the economics of con-
gestion to the Internet, see Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of 
Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1863-1900 (2006). 
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Instead, congestion costs are better understood as introducing a 
new dimension along which a particular public good’s contribution to 
economic welfare can vary.  In addition to varying according to price
and quantity, characteristics such as congestion acknowledge that pub-
lic goods can vary in terms of their quality.  In this sense, the theory of 
impure public goods can be regarded as relaxing the assumption un-
derlying pure public goods theory that the relevant goods are ho-
mogenous.18  Subsequent work has moved beyond congestion to ex-
plore other dimensions along which quality can vary.19
As Tiebout first pointed out, variations in quality create the possi-
bility that individual consumers will reveal their preferences by reallo-
cating their purchases to different providers in order to maximize 
quality.  This mobility can give rise to de facto markets for public 
goods in which consumers reveal the intensity of their preferences 
spatially, even when they lack the means to do so through the quanti-
ties they consume and lack the incentive to do so through the prices 
they pay.20  Depending on the shape of the congestion function, it is 
theoretically possible that markets will provide and allocate impure 
public goods in an efficient manner.21  The systematic bias toward un-
derproduction disappears. 
18 This assumption is usually made only implicitly.  For examples in which this as-
sumption is made explicitly, see Robert B. Ekelund, Jr. & Joe R. Hulett, Joint Supply, the 
Taussig-Pigou Controversy, and the Competitive Provision of Public Goods, 16 J.L. & ECON.
369, 381 (1973); Earl A. Thompson, The Perfectly Competitive Production of Collective Goods,
50 REV. ECON. & STAT. 1, 2 (1968). 
19 See infra Part III.B. 
20 Tiebout, supra note 17, at 419-21, 424. 
21 See, e.g., CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 351 (“Under a wide variety of cir-
cumstances, these clubs can achieve Pareto-optimal results without resorting to gov-
ernment provision.”); Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 335 (noting that in impure 
public goods, “we might find just the right conditions of scarcity of space and of inde-
pendence of consumptions” so that ordinary pricing “happens . . . to pick up each in-
direct external marginal utility”); Suzanne Scotchmer, Public Goods and the Invisible 
Hand, in MODERN PUBLIC FINANCE 93, 94 (John M. Quigley & Eugene Smolensky eds., 
1994) (“The thrust of the modern literature on clubs is that admissions to clubs are 
private goods like any others, and that we should therefore expect the market to per-
form well in the sense of the first welfare theorem . . . .”).  The same holds true for the 
strand of impure public goods known as spatial competition.  See B. Curtis Eaton & 
Myrna Holtz Wooders, Sophisticated Entry in a Model of Spatial Competition, 16 RAND J.
ECON. 282, 289-92 (1985) (analyzing circumstances under which spatial competition 
models achieve efficiency); Oakland, supra note 1, at 529 (“Under certain idealized 
conditions . . . mobility can lead to efficient levels of spatial public goods.”); Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, The Theory of Local Public Goods, in THE ECONOMICS OF PUBLIC SERVICES 274, 
311, 312 (Martin S. Feldstein & Robert P. Inman eds., 1977) (noting that spatial mod-
els can reach equilibria that maximize social welfare). 
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A shift to an impure public goods perspective on copyright thus 
would have the potential to transform the basic policy inferences gen-
erally regarded as inherent in the economics of copyright.  This is not 
to say that a shift to an impure public goods approach would be a 
panacea.  To say that markets can support the optimal production and 
allocation of impure public goods is not to say that they always will.
Again, depending on the shape of the relevant congestion function, it 
is quite possible for markets to reach equilibrium with either too many 
or too few impure public goods.  Unlike in the case of private goods, 
there is no “invisible hand” inexorably guiding the equilibria for im-
pure public goods toward efficiency.22  The equilibria for impure pub-
lic goods thus fall somewhere between the polar cases of efficient 
production (as is the case with perfect competition for private goods) 
and systematic market failure (as is the case with pure public goods).  
Instead, the policy inferences are more ambiguous and fact specific, 
in that both efficient production and market failure are possible.  
Thus, to the extent that the resulting equilibrium tends toward too 
few impure public goods, policy responses exist that simultaneously 
promote optimal production and utilization.  It is only when the mar-
ket reaches equilibrium with too many impure public goods that a 
tension exists between optimal production and utilization.  The im-
pure public goods approach thus contradicts the conventional wisdom 
that access and incentives are always and inherently in tension.  It also 
suggests, again in sharp contrast to the conventional approach, that 
the more difficult policy problem is the potential for overproduction, 
rather than underproduction. 
Despite the potential insights of returning to the fundamentals of 
public good economics by analyzing copyright through the lens of the 
Samuelson condition, an extended exploration of the connection has 
yet to appear in the literature.23 This Article seeks to rectify that state 
22 See B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, Product Differentiation, in 1 HANDBOOK 
OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 723, 742 (Richard Schmalensee & Robert D. Willig eds., 
1989) (noting the absence of an “invisible hand” with respect to spatial competition); 
Scotchmer, supra note 21, at 99 (finding the same with respect to club goods). 
23 A search of the Westlaw JLR database identifies only five articles that even men-
tion the Samuelson condition.  A similar search of the ALLREV database in the LAW-
REV library of Lexis turns up only four references.  None of those articles addresses 
copyright law.  Furthermore, only two copyright articles mention the difficulty in de-
termining the intensity of consumers’ preferences for public goods, and neither of 
those articles analyzes the problem at any depth or even refer to the Samuelson condi-
tion:  David J. Brennan, Fair Price and Public Goods:  A Theory of Value Applied to Retrans-
mission, 22 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 347, 367 (2002); Alfred C. Yen, The Legacy of Feist:
Consequences of the Weak Connection Between Copyright and the Economics of Public Goods, 52 
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of affairs.  Part I describes the conventional approach to the econom-
ics of copyright, demonstrating how it has been based on nonexclud-
ability and zero marginal cost and then analyzing how it has been ap-
plied in the context of copyright to such issues as fair use, duration, 
compulsory licenses, databases, digital rights management (DRM), 
and derivative works.  Part II examines the true source of market fail-
ure identified by Samuelson’s foundational work on public good eco-
nomics, which is the inability of markets to induce consumers to re-
veal their true preferences.  Part III explores the major strands of the 
literature on impure public goods theory, focusing first on the eco-
nomics of congestion and second on spatial competition.  It shows 
how market-based outcomes can approach first-best solutions that the 
conventional approach suggests are unattainable, while also discussing 
the ways that private ordering can fall short of optimality.  Part IV ap-
plies the insights from impure public goods theory to the copyright 
doctrines introduced in Part I.  In offering this analysis, I do not pur-
port to offer a definitive resolution of any particular area of copyright 
law.  My discussion is simply intended to demonstrate how embracing 
a different set of intuitions could reorient the way questions about 
copyright law are framed. 
I. THE CONVENTIONAL APPROACH TO APPLYING
PUBLIC GOOD ECONOMICS TO COPYRIGHT
The theory of pure public goods has undergone a fairly radical 
transformation since it was first expounded by Paul Samuelson in 
1955.  What began as a framework for determining the proper scope 
of public expenditure has evolved into a technical term of art that is 
no longer coterminous with goods that must be provided by the gov-
ernment.24
OHIO ST. L.J. 1343, 1367 (1991).  The only previous paper of which I am aware that 
explicitly links copyright and the economics of impure public goods is Stanley M. Be-
sen & Sheila Nataraj Kirby, Private Copying, Appropriability, and Optimal Copying Royalties,
32 J.L. & ECON. 255, 257, 264-70, 280 (1989).  That article models congestion simply by 
positing the presence of constantly increasing marginal cost, which fails to capture the 
problems of incentive incompatibility associated with the Samuelson condition.  See
infra note 164. 
24 That Samuelson initially envisioned his work as a comprehensive theory is un-
derscored by the fact that he titled his initial exposition “The Pure Theory of Public 
Expenditure.”  Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 6, at 387.  Samuelson later expressed 
regret over formulating the title in this manner, recognizing that his theory was under-
inclusive in that governments often provide goods and services for reasons aside from 
those addressed by his theory.  Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition, supra note 6, at 355-
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This Part lays out the way that public good economics has tradi-
tionally been applied in the copyright literature.  Section A focuses on 
the role of nonexcludability.  Section B explores the implications of 
modeling nonrivalry as zero marginal cost.  Section C reviews the 
commentary applying the conventional approach to current copy-
right-related issues, including fair use, the copyright term, compulsory 
licenses, protection of databases, DRM, and protection of derivative 
uses.  Section D discusses the analytical shortcomings of the conven-
tional approach. 
A.  Nonexcludability 
As noted above, nonexcludability is often held up as one of the 
defining characteristics of a pure public good.  Consider lighthouses, 
which have long been regarded as a classic example of a nonexclud-
able good.25  Nonexcludability means that lighthouse services cannot 
be provided to ships that have paid for those services without simulta-
neously providing them to other ships in the area that have not paid 
for them.  As a result, nonexcludability gives rise to a positive external-
ity that can cause systematic market failure.26  Standard economic the-
ory dictates that lighthouses should be created whenever the social 
benefits they would generate exceed the costs needed to create and 
operate them.  If the revenues captured by lighthouses accurately re-
flect the social benefits they create, private ordering would effectively 
ensure that this condition is met.  A profit-maximizing lighthouse 
owner would compare the revenue it would receive to the costs it 
would incur and would operate the lighthouse so long as doing so 
would generate net profits.  Nonexcludability causes the revenue gen-
erated by lighthouses to fall short of their social benefits.  For exam-
ple, if two ships find a mechanism for coordinating their activities, 
56.  The scholarship on impure public goods, discussed in Part III, infra, reveals that 
Samuelson’s theory was also overinclusive in that markets can efficiently provide cer-
tain types of public goods without government intervention. 
25 See JOHN STUART MILL, Principles of Political Economy, in 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF 
JOHN STUART MILL 968 (J.M. Robson ed., 1965) (using the lighthouse example); A.C.
PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE 183-84 (4th ed. 1938) (same); HENRY SIDGWICK,
THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 406 (3d ed. 1901) (same).  Other oft-cited 
examples of nonexcludable goods include fire and police protection, fireworks dis-
plays, and national defense. 
26 See, e.g., PIGOU, supra note 25, at 331 (offering the classic discussion of how ex-
ternalities can cause some industries to produce suboptimal levels of output); Francis 
M. Bator, The Anatomy of Market Failure, 72 Q.J. ECON. 351, 370 (1958) (describing how 
nonappropriability can cause market failure). 
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they could agree to pay a single fee and then both benefit from a 
lighthouse’s services.  Alternatively, a ship could try to free ride on 
lighthouse services for which another ship has paid.  In either event, 
the total revenue captured by the lighthouse would understate the so-
cial value of the lighthouse.  This inevitably causes some lighthouses 
to cease operating or fail to be constructed even though the benefits 
they would have created would have exceeded their costs. 
Some commentators accept the notion that copyrightable works 
are nonexcludable, in that the ready availability of copying technolo-
gies keeps authors who have once sold their works from preventing 
nonpaying customers from obtaining access to those works.27  The 
market failures associated with nonexcludability have traditionally 
provided one of the central justifications for copyright.  By providing 
legal remedies against those who copy works without paying for them, 
copyright makes works at least somewhat excludable, although the 
costliness of enforcement dictates that the exclusion that copyright 
provides will inevitably remain somewhat imperfect. 
B. Nonrivalry as Zero Marginal Cost 
As noted earlier, the other characteristic generally thought to de-
fine a pure public good is nonrivalry, which occurs when consump-
tion by one person does not reduce the supply available for consump-
tion by others.  Again, the lighthouse is often used to illustrate the 
concept.28  The fact that one ship benefits from a lighthouse’s services 
does not reduce the supply of lighthouse services available to other 
ships.
Copyrightable works are generally considered to be nonrival in 
this manner.  Once the fixed costs needed to create the first copy of a 
particular work have been incurred, any number of copies of the 
original can be made without reducing the supply available for addi-
tional copies.  As noted earlier, the copyright literature has typically 
27 Indeed, a number of leading law and economics textbooks analyze the econom-
ics of copyright in terms of nonexcludability.  E.g., ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN,
LAW AND ECONOMICS 42-43, 108-09 (3d ed. 2000); HOWELL E. JACKSON ET AL., ANA-
LYTICAL METHODS FOR LAWYERS 362-63 (2003). 
28 For illustrations, see DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN IN-
DUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 82 (4th ed. 2005); PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORD-
HAUS, ECONOMICS 37-38 (18th ed. 2005); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, ECONOMICS OF THE PUB-
LIC SECTOR 128 (3d ed. 2000). 
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modeled nonrivalry by assuming that the marginal cost is zero across 
all volumes of production.29
Zero marginal cost gives rise to a classic pricing problem.  One of 
the basic principles of welfare maximization is that individuals should 
be permitted to consume a good whenever the benefits they would 
derive from consuming the good exceed the costs of permitting them 
to do so.  Assuming that the prices individuals pay provide an accurate 
reflection of the benefits they derive, economic welfare is maximized 
if price is set to equal marginal cost.  Thus, if a creative work that 
could be costlessly copied were priced efficiently in terms of access 
(i.e., priced at marginal cost), it would be priced at zero.30  Pricing at 
zero, however, would cause the work to generate no revenue whatso-
ever, in which case the author would have no incentive to produce the 
work in the first place.31  This implies that providing authors with suf-
ficient incentive to produce creative works requires giving them the 
means to set prices that exceed marginal cost.  Any such means, how-
ever, would necessarily reduce access below efficient levels by exclud-
ing some consumers even though the benefits they would have de-
rived from consuming the work would have exceeded the costs of 
allowing them to do so.  In other words, any attempt to provide addi-
tional incentives for the creation of copyrightable works necessarily 
exacerbates the welfare losses associated with insufficient access. 
 These effects can be illustrated using Figure 1, which has become 
standard in the copyright literature.32  The exclusivity provided by
29 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. 
30 See, e.g., RICHARD A. MUSGRAVE & PEGGY B. MUSGRAVE, PUBLIC FINANCE IN THE-
ORY AND PRACTICE 51 (2d ed. 1976) (concluding, in the case of nonrival social goods, 
that “[e]fficient resource use requires that price equal marginal cost, but marginal 
cost . . . is zero, and so should be price”); Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 335 (not-
ing that the marginal cost of public broadcasting is zero, and implying that the cost of 
listening should also be zero). 
31 This conclusion does not depend on the extreme assumption that marginal cost 
of reproduction is zero.  Indeed, the same problem arises under positive marginal cost 
so long as the fixed costs are sufficiently large that production falls on the declining 
portion of the average cost curve.  When that is the case, the average cost necessarily 
lies above the marginal cost curve, and any price that equals marginal cost will neces-
sarily fall below average cost, and fail to allow the work to break even. 
32 This Figure is adapted from Yoo, supra note 5, at 227 fig.1.  For examples of 
similar figures appearing in other work, see Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Perfect 
Curve, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1799, 1802 fig.A (2000); William W. Fisher III, Property and Con-
tract on the Internet, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1203, 1236 fig.2 (1998); Fisher, supra note 1, 
at 1701 n.201 fig.1, 1708 n.232 fig.2; Edmund W. Kitch, Elementary and Persistent Errors 
in the Economic Analysis of Intellectual Property, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1727, 1732 fig.1 (2000); 
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Figure 1: The Conventional Approach to Modeling  













copyright permits authors to charge prices that exceed marginal cost.  
Left to their own devices, authors will produce at the point where the 
revenue they would generate from selling an additional copy (MR) no 
longer exceeds the cost of making an additional copy (MC), leading 
them to set price and quantity at Pmon and Q mon .  Because this is the 
point that maximizes authors’ profits, it is also necessarily the point 
that maximizes their incentives to create copyrightable works.  At the 
same time, economic welfare would be maximized if price were set 
equal to marginal cost, which would lead to the price and quantity 
represented by Peff and Q eff .  The exclusion of consumers who would 
derive net benefits from consuming the work creates deadweight loss 
(represented by the dark grey triangle).  Thus, from the standpoint of 
allocative efficiency, copyright allows authors to charge prices that are 
too high (represented by the difference between Pmon and Peff) and to 
S.J. Liebowitz, Copyright Law, Photocopying, and Price Discrimination, 8 RES. L. & ECON.
181, 185 fig.1 (1986); Robert P. Merges, Intellectual Property Rights and the New Institu-
tional Economics, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1857, 1858 (2000); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Real-
ity in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197, 1206 fig.1 (1996). 
 Figure 1 differs from the graphs appearing in previous commentary in one impor-
tant respect:  the sources cited above portray the entire difference between price and 
marginal cost (i.e., the producer surplus) as profit.  Such depictions overstate the de-
gree of profit by ignoring the role of fixed costs.  Because of fixed costs, only the por-
tion of the producer surplus lying above the average cost curve properly can be re-
garded as profit.  Yoo, supra note 5, at 226 n.46. 
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sell quantities that are too low (represented by the difference between 
Q mon and Q eff).  To the extent that this price also exceeds average cost, 
exclusivity also allows the monopolist to earn supracompetitive returns 
(represented by the light grey rectangle). 
 This analysis suggests that markets can be expected to exhibit a 
systematic bias toward underutilization of goods with zero marginal 
cost.  One classic policy response promotes access and reduces supra-
competitive returns by calibrating copyright doctrine to force authors 
to bring their production closer to efficient levels.  Absent price dis-
crimination, the lowest sustainable price and quantity is where the 
demand curve crosses the average cost curve, represented by Psus and 
Q sus .  This price (indeed any price that would allow authors to break 
even) necessarily exceeds marginal cost and thus is inevitably second-
best in terms of access.  Because any such intervention would necessar-
ily force authors to charge less than their profit-maximizing price, this 
solution also inevitably reduces incentives. 
Another classic policy response to market bias toward underutili-
zation of zero marginal cost goods is facilitating authors’ ability to en-
gage in price discrimination in the hope that allowing them to charge 
low-value users a lower price than high-value users will induce authors 
to serve the inefficiently excluded consumers between Q sus and Q eff .
Indeed, commentators have long acknowledged that perfect price dis-
crimination can help allocate public goods in an efficient manner.33
Although forcing high-value users to pay more than low-value users 
may seem unfair, wealth transfers from consumers to producers have 
no impact on efficiency. 
Other commentators have taken a less sanguine view of price dis-
crimination.  Perfect price discrimination is a practical impossibility, 
and the welfare implications of imperfect price discrimination are 
ambiguous.34  Any system of price discrimination also requires the in-
33 See JACK HIRSHLEIFER & JOHN G. RILEY, THE ANALYTICS OF UNCERTAINTY AND 
INFORMATION 259 (1992) (identifying perfect price discrimination as one of the classic 
solutions to the problems posed under the “traditional analysis” of information as a 
public good).  For an overview of these arguments, see Yoo, supra note 5, at 230. 
34 For the seminal analysis of the welfare implications of imperfect price discrimi-
nation, see JOAN ROBINSON, THE ECONOMICS OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION 188-202 (2d 
ed. 1969).  For a more contemporary discussion, see JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF IN-
DUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 137-39, 142-49 (1988).  For an application to copyright, see 
WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY LAW 339-40, 378, 389 (2003); Michael J. Meurer, Copyright Law and 
Price Discrimination, 23 CARDOZO L. REV. 55, 78-79, 100 (2001). 
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currence of implementation costs.35  In addition, to the extent that 
price discrimination enhances authors’ ability to extract consumer 
surplus from inframarginal consumers (consumers represented by the 
quantities purchased from the origin to Q sus), it will increase authors’ 
ability to earn supracompetitive returns.36  Rather than facilitating 
price discrimination, these commentators would prefer the more tra-
ditional approach of calibrating copyright to trade off second-best out-
comes in terms of both access and incentives.  Some also point out 
that the shortfall between Q sus and Q eff can be redressed through a 
wide range of alternative institutional forms, such as secondary mar-
kets and libraries, which can enhance low-value users’ ability to obtain 
access to copyrighted works.37  Indeed, with respect to customers who 
would otherwise be inefficiently excluded from purchasing, permit-
ting them to free ride completely and granting them access to the 
work is arguably a better choice. 
Finally, a number of commentators have entertained the possibil-
ity of using government subsidies to solve the marginal cost pricing 
problem.38  This would obviate the need for authors to recover their 
first-copy costs through the prices they charge and would allow copy-
35 See Benkler, supra note 3, at 2072, 2079 (arguing that implementing price dis-
crimination is costly); Meurer, supra note 34, at 101-02 (observing that price discrimi-
nation “induces . . . wasteful rent-seeking costs”); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hier-
archy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1914-15 
(2000) (noting that price discrimination requires investments to identify and sort con-
sumers into different segments). 
36 See Boyle, supra note 3, at 2025-26 (arguing that perfect price discrimination 
simply transfers surplus from consumers to producers); Meurer, supra note 34, at 92-
93, 98-102 (suggesting that price discrimination may cause undesirable redistribution 
of consumer surplus, decrease output, and induce rent-seeking); Michael J. Meurer, 
Price Discrimination, Personal Use and Piracy:  Copyright Protection of Digital Works, 45 BUFF.
L. REV. 845, 877-80 (1997) (observing that price discrimination leads to more profits 
for producers); Netanel, supra note 3, at 293 n.31 (noting that price discrimination 
allows copyright owners to capture a larger share of the consumer surplus). 
37 See Cohen, supra note 32, at 1806 (arguing that price discrimination theories do 
not account for alternate means of access, such as second-hand markets and libraries); 
Jonathan Weinberg, Hardware-Based ID, Rights Management, and Trusted Systems, in THE 
COMMODIFICATION OF INFORMATION 343, 357-59 (Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock 
Netanel eds., 2002) (observing that price discrimination would cut off sharing and 
secondary markets). 
38 For classic copyright articles discussing the use of subsidies to permit copy-
righted works to be distributed at marginal cost, see Arrow, supra note 1, at 623; 
Breyer, supra note 1, at 306-07; Robert M. Hurt & Robert M. Schuchman, The Economic 
Rationale of Copyright, 56 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 426 (1966); William R. Johnson, The Eco-
nomics of Copying, 93 J. POL. ECON. 158, 171-72 (1985); Arnold Plant, The Economic As-
pects of Copyright in Books, 1 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 167, 193 (1934). 
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righted works to be sold at marginal cost.  Indeed, as Harold Hotel-
ling noted in his classic 1938 article, declining average costs caused by 
large, up-front fixed costs represent one of the classic justifications for 
government subsidies.39
C. Applications of the Conventional Approach to  
Specific Copyright Doctrines 
Commentators have relied on the putative tradeoff between access 
and incentives implicit in the conventional approach when using pub-
lic good economics to analyze a wide range of copyright-related issues.  
These include the fair use doctrine, copyright duration, compulsory 
licenses, database protection, DRM, and derivative works. 
1.  Fair Use 
The dominant economic justification for fair use regards it as a 
means of compensating for market failures induced by transaction 
costs.  Under this rationale, fair use is justified by the fact that transac-
tion costs can prevent low-value users from obtaining access to copy-
righted works even though economic welfare would increase if they 
were permitted to do so.40  In the tradition of the analysis of liability 
rules pioneered by Guido Calabresi and Douglas Melamed,41 this ar-
gument would create what amounts to a compulsory license priced at 
zero whenever friction in the bargaining process prevents low-value, 
welfare-enhancing transactions from occurring.  Consistent with this 
interpretation, courts have limited fair use to copying that does not 
adversely affect the market for the copyrighted work.42  The Supreme 
39 See Harold Hotelling, The General Welfare in Relation to Problems of Taxation and of 
Railway and Utility Rates, 6 ECONOMETRICA 242, 242 (1938) (arguing that “taxes might 
well be applied to cover the fixed costs of electric power plants, waterworks, railroads, 
and other industries in which fixed costs are large, so as to reduce to the level of mar-
ginal cost the prices charged for the services and products of these industries”).  For a 
modern analysis applying Hotelling’s insights to intellectual property, see John F. 
Duffy, The Marginal Cost Controversy in Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 37 (2004). 
40 For the seminal statement of this argument, see Gordon, supra note 1, at 1614-
22, 1627-30.  For later, similar arguments, see Timothy J. Brennan, Harper & Row v. 
The Nation, Inc.:  Copyrightability and Fair Use, 33 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 368, 382 
(1986); Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 357-58. 
41 Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and In-
alienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1106-07, 1119-21 (1972). 
42 See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 593 (1994) (“Evidence of 
substantial harm to [the relevant market] would weigh against a finding of fair 
use . . . .”); Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 566-67 
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Court has called the effect on the potential market for the copy-
righted work “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair 
use.”43
Over time, the emergence of new institutional arrangements (in-
cluding performing rights organizations, such as Broadcast Music, Inc. 
(BMI) and the American Society for Composers, Authors, and Pub-
lishers (ASCAP),44 and copyright collectives, such as the Copyright 
Clearance Center (CCC);45 new distribution and communication 
technologies, such as the Internet;46 and the advent of self-help tech-
nologies, such as DRM47) have reduced the transaction costs of licens-
ing low-value uses of copyrighted works.  Were transaction costs the 
only economic justification for fair use, these developments would 
support a significant contraction of its scope.48
(1985) (“‘Fair use, when properly applied, is limited to copying by others which does 
not materially impair the marketability of the work which is copied.’” (citation omit-
ted)); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 450-51 (1984) 
(rejecting fair use when “the particular use is harmful, or that if it should become 
widespread, it would adversely affect the potential market for the copyrighted work”); 
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386-88 (6th Cir. 
1996) (en banc) (refusing to find fair use for copying that impaired the market for 
licensing photocopies for coursepacks); cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000) (including “the 
effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work” as 
one of the factors to be considered in determining the scope of fair use). 
43 Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.  But see Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 
60 F.3d 913, 926 (2d Cir. 1994) (suggesting that the Supreme Court may no longer 
regard the effect on the potential market as being of paramount importance). 
44 For descriptions of BMI and ASCAP, see Broadcast Music, Inc. v. CBS, Inc., 441 
U.S. 1, 4-5 (1979); Stanley M. Besen et al., An Economic Analysis of Copyright Collectives,
78 VA. L. REV. 383, 385-86, 401-02 (1992).  For a general description of performing 
rights organizations, see Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules:  Intellectual 
Property Rights and Collective Rights Organizations, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1293, 1328-40 (1996). 
45 For descriptions of the CCC, see Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930; Besen et 
al., supra note 44, at 386-87. 
46 For observations that these technologies have decreased transaction costs, see 
Jane C. Ginsburg, Authors and Users in Copyright, 45 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1, 15 
(1997); Trotter Hardy, Property (and Copyright) in Cyberspace, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 217, 
239-42; Edmund W. Kitch, Can the Internet Shrink Fair Use?, 78 NEB. L. REV. 880, 881 
(1999); Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction?  Property Rights and Contract in the “Newto-
nian” World of On-Line Commerce, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 115, 130-35 (1997). 
47 See infra Part I.C.4 (describing DRM). 
48 Note that the emergence of new markets for low-value uses would not redress 
market failures that arise with respect to uses such as parody, in which bargaining fails 
because the would-be parodist is locked into a bilateral monopoly with the original au-
thor.  For arguments to this effect, see Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players 
Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 975 (10th Cir. 1996); LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, at 158-59; 
Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me?:  Notes on Market Failure and the Parody De-
fense in Copyright, 21 AIPLA Q.J. 305, 308-12 (1993). 
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These developments have placed renewed importance on alterna-
tive economic justifications for fair use, including those based on pub-
lic good economics.  Some have argued that fair use is needed to 
mitigate the welfare losses associated with allowing authors to charge 
prices that exceed marginal cost by making it possible for low-value 
users who are inefficiently excluded by the price mechanism to obtain 
access to copyrighted works.49  Others have justified fair use as a way 
to prevent copyright holders from earning supracompetitive returns.50
The fact that market failure is endemic under the theory of pure pub-
lic goods has led some scholars to question the usefulness of market 
failure as a benchmark for determining the scope of fair use.51
2.  Duration 
Commentators have also invoked public good economics as sup-
port for limitations on the duration of the copyright term.  These 
commentators accept the access/incentives tradeoff implicit in the 
conventional approach, acknowledging that although authors must be 
given the exclusivity necessary to charge the supramarginal cost prices 
required to support the creation of the work in the first instance, 
those rights inevitably impose deadweight losses.  The need to balance 
these two considerations implies a copyright term of limited duration 
that provides sufficient incentive to induce the creation of the work, 
but thereafter allows the work to become freely available to all at mar-
ginal cost.52
49 John Cirace, When Does Complete Copying of Copyrighted Works for Purposes Other 
Than for Profit or Sale Constitute Fair Use?  An Economic Analysis of the Sony Betamax and 
Williams & Wilkins Cases, 28 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 647, 657-58, 660-62 (1984); Fisher, supra
note 1, at 1700-19. 
50 Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1135-36 
(1990); Sterk, supra note 32, at 1211-12. 
51 See Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Fair Use and Market Failure:  Sony Revisited, 82 B.U. L.
REV. 975, 996 (2002) (“Because market failure is inevitable, the concept of market fail-
ure cannot serve as a useful guide in determining which uses of a copyrighted work 
should be fair . . . .”). 
52 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Indefinitely Renewable Copyright, 70 U.
CHI. L. REV. 471, 475-76 (2003).  For other evaluations of copyright duration in terms 
of public good economics, see Wendy J. Gordon, Authors, Publishers, and Public Goods:  
Trading Gold for Dross, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 159, 164-66, 170-77 (2002); Avishalom Tor & 
Dotan Oliar, Incentives To Create Under a “Lifetime-Plus-Years” Copyright Duration:  Lessons 
from a Behavioral Economic Analysis for Eldred v. Ashcroft, 36 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 437, 446-
49 (2002). 
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3.  Compulsory Licenses 
As noted earlier, high transaction costs have provided the tradi-
tional justification for compulsory licenses,53 as evidenced by the con-
sistency with which the government has invoked this rationale when 
enacting compulsory licenses.54  The reduction in transaction costs as-
sociated with digital transmission, networking, and the emergence of 
copyright collectives has undercut this justification, which has placed 
renewed emphasis on alternative justifications for compulsory li-
cense.55
For example, some commentators justify compulsory licenses as a 
means to force copyright owners to allow greater access to their 
works.56  Envisioning compulsory licenses as a way to promote access 
suggests that compulsory licenses can also be viewed as a way to re-
solve the tradeoff between access and incentives implicit in the tradi-
tional approach to pure public goods.57  Other scholars have implicitly 
drawn on arguments favoring the use of liability rules when valuation 
is difficult58 to theorize that the difficulties in getting customers to re-
veal their preferences for pure public goods in a truthful manner jus-
53 See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text. 
54 H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 89 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5704 
(supporting compulsory licenses for cable retransmission of broadcast signals because 
“it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to ne-
gotiate with every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable system”); 
INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL IN-
FORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 52 (1995) (“In certain circumstances, particularly where trans-
action costs are believed to dwarf per-transaction royalties, Congress has found it 
necessary to provide for compulsory licenses.”). 
55 See supra notes 44-48 and accompanying text; INFO. INFRASTRUCTURE TASK
FORCE, supra note 54, at 52 (concluding that “[t]echnology will facilitate individual 
licensing schemes” and that “under current conditions, additional compulsory licens-
ing of intellectual property rights is neither necessary nor desirable”). 
56 E.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value:  Copyright Protection of Works 
of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1926 (1990) (“[T]he real purpose of a compul-
sory license is to reduce the extent to which the copyright ownership of the covered 
work conveys monopoly power, so that the copyright owner must make the work avail-
able to all who wish to access and exploit it.”). 
57 See Charles Lubinsky, Reconsidering Retransmission Consent:  An Examination of the 
Retransmission Consent Provision (47 U.S.C. § 325(b)) of the 1992 Cable Act, 49 FED. COMM.
L.J. 99, 128-30, 140 (1996) (describing the public goods problem inherent in television 
programming and noting the argument that compulsory licenses are designed “to re-
solve the standard public goods problem dealing with the makers of creative works”). 
58 See Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 41, at 1106-07 (arguing that liability rules 
are preferable to property rules when consumers have incentives to conceal their true 
valuations to appropriate a higher proportion of the available surplus).
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tifies making the work available for a standard royalty set by the gov-
ernment.  The government would base this royalty on new survey 
methodologies that are better able to ascertain the intensity of con-
sumers’ preferences for particular public goods.59
4.  Database Protection 
Commentators have also drawn on the economics of pure public 
goods when analyzing the proper scope of database protection.  For 
example, Alfred Yen employs public good economics to critique the 
Supreme Court’s Feist decision limiting copyright protection to data-
bases in which creators have exercised creativity in the selection and 
arrangement of data.60  Yen takes the traditional approach to public 
good economics as his starting point, defining pure public goods in 
terms of nonexcludability and nonrivalry.  Because databases satisfy 
these conditions, Yen notes that they will be subject to systematic un-
derproduction, but is concerned that any attempt to increase incen-
tives for their production will run afoul of the tradeoff between access 
and incentives.  He thus proposes limiting any protection for data-
bases to those that are unlikely to recoup their costs of production.61
The problem is that creativity in selection and arrangement bears no 
relation to the likelihood of recoupment, which depends on factors 
such as the magnitude of the first-mover advantage, the ratio of sales 
to development costs, the extent to which the database could be fi-
nanced through the sale of complementary goods and advertising, the 
availability of copy protection, and the database producer’s ability to 
engage in price discrimination.62  As a result, Yen recommends aban-
doning creative selection as the touchstone of copyright protection 
for databases in favor of an approach that bears a stronger relation to 
the economics of public goods.63
James Gibson similarly associates markets for databases with the 
problems posed by public good economics.  Like Yen, Gibson begins 
59 See Brennan, supra note 23, at 367-75. 
60 Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348-49, 362-63 (1991). 
61 Yen, supra note 23, at 1365-69. 
62 Id. at 1369-73.  This aspect of Yen’s argument is reminiscent of a classic line of 
articles analyzing the economics of copyright, which suggests that first-mover advan-
tages, threats of retribution, and other methods might be sufficient to permit authors 
to recover their fixed costs even in the absence of copyright protection.  See Breyer, 
supra note 1, at 299-306; Hurt & Schuchman, supra note 38, at 427-29; Plant, supra note 
38, at 173-75. 
63 Yen, supra note 23, at 1374, 1377. 
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his analysis by positing that databases confront the classic problems of 
nonexcludability and supramarginal cost pricing.64  Although the fact 
that databases once had to be reified in a concrete form has histori-
cally struck a balance between access and incentives by necessarily 
creating a degree of excludability and rivalry, the digitization of data 
and the advent of copy and access protection have upset this balance 
by giving database creators greater control over their works.65  Thus, at 
least with respect to sole source data that cannot be independently 
compiled by others,66 Gibson proposes requiring that database crea-
tors deposit copies of their databases in a central repository, available 
for privileged uses and ready for release into the public domain once 
the term of protection has expired.67
5.  Digital Rights Management  
Public good economics has also influenced the debate about 
DRM, in which sellers of creative works use license terms and techno-
logical copy protection to impose restrictions greater than those estab-
lished by copyright law.  Some have lauded this development, arguing 
that by facilitating price discrimination, DRM will increase access to 
copyrighted works.68  Others have taken a less sanguine view, arguing 
that DRM allows parties to alter the balance between access and in-
centives struck by the copyright statute.69  Opponents contend that 
not only is there no guarantee that DRM will necessarily lead to 
greater access,70 but also that it introduces bias toward certain types of 
64 James Gibson, Re-reifying Data, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 163, 172-74 (2004). 
65 Id. at 179-81, 189-98. 
66 Id. at 216-20. 
67 Id. at 233-39. 
68 E.g., Tom W. Bell, Fair Use vs. Fared Use:  The Impact of Automated Rights Manage-
ment on Copyright’s Fair Use Doctrine, 76 N.C. L. REV. 557, 587-90 (1998); Fisher, supra
note 32, at 1234-40; David Friedman, In Defense of Private Orderings:  Comments on Julie 
Cohen’s “Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help”, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1151, 1169 
(1998).
69 E.g., Niva Elkin-Koren, Copyright Policy and the Limits of Freedom of Contract, 12 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 93, 101 (1997); Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap 
Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1239, 1277-78 (1995); Netanel, supra note 3, at 385; David A. 
Rice, Public Goods, Private Contract and Public Policy:  Federal Preemption of Software License 
Prohibitions Against Reverse Engineering, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 543, 544-46, 591, 619-21 
(1992); cf. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Copyright Preemption After the ProCD Case:  A Market-
Based Approach, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 53, 80 (1997) (describing this argument with-
out endorsing it). 
70 See LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, at 40 (noting the absence of a firm theo-
retical or empirical basis for believing that imperfect price discrimination is likely to 
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content and content providers71 and enhances copyright holders’ abil-
ity to capture supracompetitive returns.72
6.  Derivative Uses 
Commentators have also invoked public good economics when 
analyzing the proper scope of derivative use rights.  As with the other 
aspects of copyright protection, derivative uses pose the familiar 
tradeoff implicit in the conventional approach:  giving broad protec-
tion to derivative uses increases the incentives for creating copyright-
able works, but introduces a degree of allocative inefficiency by deny-
ing some customers access to those works even when it would be 
welfare enhancing to permit access.  In the context of derivative uses, 
however, these arguments receive an additional twist because the de-
rivative use right also prevents subsequent authors from creating new 
works based on prior material.  Economic welfare is thus reduced not 
only by the static efficiency losses resulting from the inability of some 
consumers to obtain access to the works that exist today, but also by 
the dynamic efficiency losses resulting from the works that would be 
created in the future.73
For example, Glynn Lunney argues that public good economics 
justifies drawing a distinction between derivative users and ordinary 
users of a copyrighted work.  Each ordinary user typically must pur-
chase a copy of the work in order to obtain its benefits.  Derivative us-
ers, in contrast, seek to incorporate elements of the original work into 
a new work of authorship, thereby exploiting a work’s “public good 
increase output); Benkler, supra note 3, at 2079 (arguing that imperfect price dis-
crimination’s impact on aggregate social welfare is an empirical question that cannot 
be determined a priori); Meurer, supra note 36, at 894-98 (concluding that price dis-
crimination made possible by contract in addition to broad copyright protection may 
decrease output).  See generally Yoo, supra note 5, at 230 & n.59 (collecting sources on 
the ambiguous impact of imperfect price discrimination on output). 
71 See Cohen, supra note 32, at 1811 (arguing that price discrimination will not en-
courage access to goods for which there are few substitutes); Netanel, supra note 35, at 
1915 (stating that “[f]irms with extensive content inventories and an established cus-
tomer base” are better able to exploit the advantages of price discrimination). 
72 See Boyle, supra note 3, at 2021-23 (providing an example of price discrimina-
tion leading to increased profits); Meurer, supra note 36, at 877-80 (noting that 
“[m]ore price discrimination means more profit to the sellers of digital works”). 
73 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 994-99 (describing the costs associated with limiting 
follow-on innovators’ ability to access existing works); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Reexamining 
Copyright’s Incentives-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L. REV. 483, 629 (1996) (arguing that 
when derivative works are involved, welfare maximization must take into account the 
production of new works as well as the allocation of existing works). 
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aspect”:  they typically need to purchase only a single copy of the 
original work in order to serve multiple customers of the derivative 
work.74  Absent a separate derivative use right, authors would have no 
choice but to charge the same price to both ordinary and derivative 
users, which would inefficiently exclude some ordinary users.  The de-
rivative use right allows authors to charge derivative users prices that 
reflect the fact that the single sale to the derivative user actually serves 
as a proxy for multiple purchases of the original work.75  Lunney 
would limit the scope of copyright’s derivative work protection to uses 
that implicate the original work’s public good aspects, which are those 
with a transformative component.76
Mark Lemley similarly concludes that public good economics can 
help delineate the proper scope of the derivative use right.  Although 
copyright typically balances the tradeoff between access and incentives 
implicit in the conventional approach to public good economics by 
carefully calibrating the scope and duration of copyright protection,77
additional complexities arise when a copyrightable work is simultane-
ously a good consumed by ordinary users and an input used by deriva-
tive users to create new works of authorship.  As a theoretical matter, 
the holder of the copyright in the original work has every incentive to 
license the work in a way that maximizes its value.78  As a practical mat-
ter, however, markets for licensing copyrighted works are often im-
peded by a number of imperfections—such as transaction costs, un-
certainty, externalities, strategic behavior, and noneconomic 
incentives—that can inefficiently limit access and tip the balance away 
74 Lunney, supra note 73, at 635-38. 
75 Id. at 639-40. 
76 Id. at 641-45.  Lunney views the quantum of additional creative expression re-
quired for a follow-on work to fall outside the scope of the derivative use right as quite 
small.  In Lunney’s words, “any significant transformation of or variation from the un-
derlying work should preclude a finding of infringement even if the underlying work 
remains recognizable.”  Id. at 650.  Lunney makes his point about derivative uses as 
part of a larger claim that strengthening copyright protection can impose opportunity 
costs by diverting resources from more economically beneficial activities.  Id. at 488-89.  
This argument presumes that the overall economy is already in general equilibrium, 
which would only be true if the level of copyright protection were already calibrated 
correctly.  Furthermore, if the market is not in general equilibrium, it is theoretically 
possible that strengthening copyright could cause economic welfare to increase as well 
as decrease.  Yoo, supra note 5, at 241 n.95. 
77 Lemley, supra note 1, at 994-99. 
78 Id. at 1047. 
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from the access side of the tradeoff by preventing welfare-enhancing 
licensing from occurring.79
Accordingly, Lemley argues that giving the author of the original 
work complete control over all derivative works would not strike the 
proper balance.  Instead, he advocates a system of divided entitle-
ments similar to the system used in patent law, in which the initial au-
thor would retain a copyright over the original work, while authors of 
derivative works would control the additional copyrightable expres-
sion that they have added.  Under this approach, follow-on authors 
cannot publish or otherwise commercialize their derivative works 
without obtaining a license from the original author.  At the same 
time, the original author cannot use the additional creative contribu-
tion embodied in the derivative work without first receiving the fol-
low-on author’s permission.80
According to Lemley, this system of divided entitlements would 
recalibrate the balance between access and incentives by giving copy-
right holders greater incentive to reach licensing agreements with au-
thors of derivative works.  Dividing entitlements in this manner en-
courages licensing agreements by dictating that absent such an 
agreement, neither the initial author nor the follow-on author will be 
able to take advantage of the improvements.81
In addition, giving follow-on authors a degree of copyright protec-
tion offers a solution to Arrow’s information paradox.82  The absence 
of such protection places authors of derivative works in a Catch-22.  
Negotiating licenses requires follow-on authors to disclose the nature 
of their derivative works in order to allow the initial authors to assess 
their value.  The absence of any independent copyright protection in 
derivative works leaves initial authors free to appropriate them with-
out the follow-on authors’ consent once their content has been dis-
closed.  The risk of losing the entirety of the derivative work makes 
follow-on authors understandably reluctant to engage in licensing ne-
gotiations, which reduces access below optimal levels and forces initial 
authors to take a greater role in identifying potential innovators.  Giv-
ing derivative works a degree of independent copyright protection 
would allow follow-on authors to initiate contact with initial authors 
79 Id. at 1048-67. 
80 Id. at 1062, 1074-77. 
81 Id. at 1062-63. 
82 See Arrow, supra note 1, at 615 (describing the paradox). 
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with greater impunity, which would in turn promote access by making 
welfare-enhancing licensing agreements easier to reach.83
D.  The Analytical Shortcomings of the Conventional Approach 
The basic policy inferences that follow from the conventional ap-
proach to applying public good economics to copyright have exerted 
significant influence over the economic analysis of copyright.  It is 
thus interesting that Samuelson did not regard either nonexcludabil-
ity or zero marginal cost to be essential attributes of pure public 
goods.84  If well taken, Samuelson’s challenge to the conventional ap-
proach would have sweeping implications for the economic analysis of 
copyright.
Consider first the role of nonexcludability.  The claim that non-
excludability inevitably causes market failure for copyrightable works 
has increasingly come under empirical and conceptual attack.  As an 
empirical matter, the emergence of copy protection and DRM has 
greatly increased authors’ ability to employ self-help in preventing 
nonpaying customers from obtaining access to their works.85  Indeed, 
it has long been recognized that exclusion is typically possible, with 
the costs of exclusion depending on the state of technology.86  Re-
stated in terms of the lighthouse example, the problem is not that the 
exclusion of nonpaying ships is impossible, but rather that excluding 
them would be prohibitively costly.87
As a conceptual matter, the work of Ronald Coase has shown that 
private ordering may be better able than previously thought to correct 
for the market failures caused by externalities.  The renowned Coase 
theorem holds that so long as transaction costs are low, the parties 
may be able to bargain around externalities to reach the efficient re-
sult without government intervention.88  This insight complemented 
Coase’s earlier work showing how the choice of institutional form can 
83 See Lemley, supra note 1, at 1062, 1068-69. 
84 See Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 335-36. 
85 See supra Part I.C.4 (discussing DRM). 
86 E.g., Bator, supra note 26, at 374-75. 
87 Id. at 376 n.5. 
88 R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960).  Coase illus-
trated his point through the classic scenario in which a factory’s smokestack imposes 
negative externalities on residents living nearby.  One solution is for the government 
to impose a tax on the factory equal to the amount of harm it imposes on the resi-
dents.  Another solution is for the private residents to pay the factory not to pollute.  
Id. at 41-42. 
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minimize transaction costs.89  He later applied this approach to the 
problem of public goods in his classic critique of the claim that the 
nonexcludability of lighthouse services required that they be provided 
by the government.  He pointed out that private entities were able to 
provide English lighthouses for decades by identifying another, more 
easily excludable good—specifically port usage—that could serve as a 
proxy for the consumption of lighthouse services.90  Subsequent ques-
tions about the applicability of this insight to early English light-
houses91 have not blunted Coase’s core insight about the ability of al-
ternative institutional forms to reduce transaction costs to the point 
where markets can emerge.  This has been demonstrated eloquently 
by the emergence of performing rights organizations, such as BMI, 
ASCAP, and the CCC.92
On a more fundamental level, a close analysis of the literature on 
public goods reveals that whether or not a good is excludable does not 
eliminate the need to satisfy the Samuelson condition, which as noted 
earlier is generally recognized as the distinguishing characteristic of 
public goods.  I will postpone detailed analysis of the different roles 
that nonexcludability and the Samuelson condition play in the analy-
sis of pure public goods until after the discussion of the foundations 
of public good economics appearing in the next Section.  For now, it 
suffices to point to Samuelson’s observation that the fundamental 
problems surrounding public goods would remain even if those goods 
were rendered completely excludable.93  As a result, a number of lead-
89 R.H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386, 392 (1937). 
90 R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 360-61 (1974), re-
printed in FAMOUS FABLES OF ECONOMICS 32, 32 (Daniel F. Spulber ed., 2002); cf. Yoo, 
supra note 17, at 1873-85 (drawing on Coase’s critique of the lighthouse market failure 
to show how alternative institutional arrangements can provide market-based solutions 
to externalities in the context of the Internet). 
91 See Richard A. Epstein, The Libertarian Quartet, REASON, Jan. 1999, at 61, 64-65 
(“The only way the fee can be charged is through the exercise of state monopoly 
power at the port.”); Andrew Odlyzko, The Evolution of Price Discrimination in Transporta-
tion and Its Implications for the Internet, 3 REV. NETWORK ECON. 323, 325-26, 341-42 
(2004) (noting that English lighthouse fees were set by government charters, not 
commercial negotiations); David E. Van Zandt, The Lessons of the Lighthouse:  “Govern-
ment” or “Private” Provision of Goods, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 47, 48 (1993) (arguing that the 
provision of lighthouse services could not be characterized as a “private enterprise”). 
92 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
93 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 335 (“Being able to limit a public good’s 
consumption does not make it a true-blue private good.”); see also J.G. Head, Public 
Goods and Public Policy, 17 PUB. FIN. 197, 215 (1962) (tracing the decreasing role played 
by nonexcludability in Samuelson’s work). 
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ing public good theorists have questioned whether nonexcludability 
should be regarded as part of the definition of a pure public good.94
Conceptual problems also surround the fact that the conventional 
approach models nonrivalry with the assumption that marginal cost is 
zero.  Indeed, were zero marginal cost the only problem, public good 
economics would simply be an application of the general problem of 
declining average cost that dominates the study of public utilities and 
natural monopoly, and the solution would simply require allocating 
fixed costs across different outputs.95  Samuelson clearly rejected this 
claim, arguing that public goods raised concerns that are distinct from 
and independent of the problems of joint supply.96  Although 
Samuelson acknowledged that his theory did have implications for de-
clining average costs,97 he did not regard deviations from marginal 
cost pricing as the central problem posed by pure public goods.  In-
deed, as Samuelson pointed out, the problems he identified would 
remain even if one used government subsidies to allow producers to 
price at marginal cost.98  For reasons that I will subsequently explore 
in greater detail, pricing copyrighted works at marginal cost would not 
solve the essential difficulty in getting consumers to reveal the inten-
sity of their preferences.  In other words, even if the government used 
subsidies to allow producers to price at marginal cost, it would still 
face insuperable problems when determining how big those subsidies 
should be. 
94 In the words of one leading commentator, “the significance of exclusion rests 
with the characteristics of private market provision of public goods and the financing 
options open to the government should it decide to provide the public good, but not 
with the fundamental properties of public goods themselves.”  Oakland, supra note 1, 
at 491.  For other examples of this view, see STEPHEN SHMANSKE, PUBLIC GOODS,
MIXED GOODS, AND MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 7, 17-20 (1991); Bator, supra note 
26, at 374-75; Oakland, supra note 1, at 486.  For similar conclusions appearing in the 
commentary on copyright, see Brennan, supra note 23, at 350; Brennan, supra note 3, 
at 686 n.43. 
95 James Buchanan, Joint Supply, Externality and Optimality, 33 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 
404, 408 (1966); Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 13 J.L. & ECON.
293, 293, 304-06 (1970). 
96 Paul A. Samuelson, Contrast Between Welfare Conditions for Joint Supply and for Pub-
lic Goods, 51 REV. ECON. & STAT. 226 (1969); Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 355; see 
also Ekelund & Hulett, supra note 18 at 387; Oakland, supra note 1, at 490-91. 
97 See Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition, supra note 6, at 356 (acknowledging that 
his initial analysis “did not go far enough in claiming for it relevance to the vast area of 
decreasing costs”).
98 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 335-36. 
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II. THE SAMUELSON CONDITION AS THE TRUE FOUNDATION OF 
PUBLIC GOOD ECONOMICS
There is thus reason to question whether nonexcludability and 
zero marginal cost capture the essence of public good economics.  
Why this is the case can be best understood by returning to the origi-
nal conception of public good economics articulated by Samuelson.  
Framing the issues in terms of nonexcludability and zero marginal 
cost overlooks what Samuelson regarded as the defining characteristic 
of pure public goods.  Specifically, the fundamental problem is that 
consumers of pure public goods have both the motivation and the 
ability to understate the intensity of their preferences.  This incentive 
incompatibility is what Samuelson saw as the true root of the market’s 
tendency to underproduce public goods. 
A.  The Baseline Case of Private Goods 
The economic problems posed by pure public goods are most eas-
ily understood by comparing a two-person economy involving two pri-
vate goods with a two-person economy involving a private good and a 
public good.99  For the first economy, assume that the society is popu-
lated by two people, Adam and Beth, who each have a demand for 
apples and oranges.  Both goods are clearly rival, in that Adam’s con-
sumption of apples and oranges reduces the supply of each available 
for consumption by Beth and vice versa.  Both goods are also clearly 
divisible, in that Adam’s decision to consume a particular quantity of 
apples or oranges does not require that Beth consume the same quan-
tity.  Figure 2 represents both Adam’s and Beth’s demand curves for 
apples, with the quantity of apples (a) depicted on the horizontal axis 
and the price of apples (Pa) depicted on the vertical axis.  Adam’s 






The market demand curve can be derived simply by adding to-
gether the quantity of apples that Adam and Beth would demand at 
any particular price.  In other words, the market demand curve is the 
horizontal summation of each consumer’s individual demand curves. 
99 This specific example is adapted from HARVEY S. ROSEN, PUBLIC FINANCE 58-63 
(7th ed. 2005).  For a more mathematical treatment of the distinction between private 
and pure public goods, see HAL R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 144-57 (3d ed. 
1992).
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A
A B
Figure 2:  Aggregation of Demand for Private Goods  
(Horizontal Summation)
aP aP aP
The equilibrium can be determined by superimposing a market supply 
curve on the market demand curve, which leads to an equilibrium 
price of Pa* (as depicted in Figure 2).  At this point, Adam consumes 
 and Beth consumes .  Note that there is no reason to assume 
that  and  will be equal.  In other words, both Adam and Beth 
pay the same price and reveal the intensity of their respective prefer-




 The resulting equilibrium has the significant property of allocat-
ing apples in a Pareto-efficient manner.  According to standard con-
sumer theory, Adam and Beth adjust their purchases until both of 
their marginal rates of substitution of apples for oranges (MRSao)
equal the price of apples divided by the price of oranges (Pa/Po).
100
100 Proofs of this relation appear in every standard microeconomic textbook and 
can be easily illustrated in the context of the two-good economy involving apples and 
oranges discussed above.  A particular consumer’s willingness to trade apples for or-
anges can be used to generate a set of indifference curves.  The farther the indiffer-
ence curve is from the origin, the higher the level of utility achieved.  The slope at any 
point along the indifference curve is the consumer’s marginal rate of substitution of 
apples for oranges (MRSao ).  Consumers are also subject to budget constraints, repre-
sented by a straight line with a slope of -Pa /Po .  The consumer has the incentive to try 
to reach the indifference curve farthest from the origin given the relevant budget con-
straint.  Optimal consumption will occur at the point where the indifference curve is 
tangent to the budget line.  At this point, MRSao = Pa /Po .  If MRSao > Pa /Po , then Adam 
could increase his utility by increasing his consumption of apples and decreasing his 
consumption of oranges.  The marginal utility he derives from apples will fall and the 
marginal utility he derives from oranges will rise until MRSao = Pa /Po .
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Because only relative prices matter, the price of oranges can be arbi-
trarily set equal to $1 without loss of generality.  If so, the condition 
for maximizing surplus is MRSao = Pa , and the price of apples repre-
sents the rate at which an individual is willing to substitute apples for 
oranges.  Because Adam’s demand curve ( ) shows the maximum 




ao for any particular level of apple consumption.  
Similarly,  represents Beth’s MRSBaD ao schedule.  In equilibrium, both 
Adam and Beth set MRSao = Pa* .  At the same time, the supply curve 
for apples (Sa) represents the marginal rate of transformation of ap-
ples for oranges (MRTao) at any particular level of production.  In 






r indifference curves 
a per year 
budget line 
(|slope| = Pa /Po)
101 On the supply side, the scarcity of inputs necessitates a tradeoff between the 
number of apples and the number of oranges that can be produced.  This is depicted 
by the production-possibility frontier, which represents the maximum amount of the 
two products that can be jointly produced given the existing resource constraints.  The 
slope of the production-possibility frontier at any point is the marginal rate of trans-
formation of apples or oranges (MRTao ).  At the same time, producers will be willing 
to forgo selling apples so long as they can make up for the lost revenue by selling addi-
tional oranges.  This tradeoff can be used to generate isoprofit curves, with the curves 
located farther from the origin representing higher levels of profit.  The slope of the 
isoprofit curves is necessarily –Pa /Po .  The producer would like to reach the highest 
level of profit permitted by its resource constraints.  This occurs where the production-
possibility frontier is tangent to the isoprofit curve, which necessarily implies that 








a per year 
isoprofit curves
(|slope| = Pa /Po)
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Thus, in equilibrium .  All consumers re-
ceive the same marginal utility from each good, but they consume dif-
ferent quantities.  Because neither the consumers nor the producers 
can make themselves better off by moving to any other point, the re-
sulting equilibrium is Pareto optimal.  Equally importantly, neither 
Adam nor Beth has any incentive to misrepresent the value each 
places on apples.  Because the uniform price is determined by the 
market, the only way they can increase the utility that they derive is by 
varying the quantities of the good that they purchase.  They could 
purchase less than or more than their preferred quantity of the good, 
but doing so would simply have the effect of lowering the utility they 
derive.  Thus, absent other sources of market failure, when goods are 
divisible the first welfare theorem of neoclassical economics indicates 
that markets are likely to support efficient levels of production and 






B. Pure Public Goods 
A starkly different situation arises with respect to pure public 
goods.  In the original Samuelsonian conception of nonrivalry, the 
central feature is not jointness in production, typically modeled by 
zero marginal cost, but rather jointness in consumption, which, as 
noted earlier, means that consumption by one person does not re-
duce the supply available for consumption by others.  Stated some-
what more formally, nonrivalry allows the same quantity to serve as an 
argument in both Adam’s and Beth’s consumption functions.102  Con-
sumption of a good is fully joint when everyone who purchases the 
good necessarily consumes the entire industry output, although they 
may pay different prices.  When that is the case, the good is described 
as being indivisible,103 which means that if both Adam and Beth pur-
chase the good, each necessarily consumes a good of the same magni-
tude. 
102 See supra note 7 and accompanying text. 
103 HOWARD R. BOWEN, TOWARD SOCIAL ECONOMY 172-73 (1948) [hereinafter 
BOWEN, SOCIAL ECONOMY]; JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE DEMAND AND SUPPLY OF PUBLIC 
GOODS 174-76 (1968); SAMUELSON & NORDHAUS, supra note 28, at 372; Bator, supra
note 26, at 374; Howard R. Bowen, The Interpretation of Voting in the Allocation of Economic 
Resources, 43 Q.J. ECON. 27, 27 (1943) [hereinafter Bowen, Voting].  Indeed, the lead-
ing book-length analysis of public good economics regards the terms “nonrivalry of 
consumption” and “indivisibility of benefits” as synonymous.  CORNES & SANDLER, su-
pra note 1, at 8. 
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In addition, even though a producer of a pure public good cannot 
provide one consumer with a different level of services than any other 
consumer, the producer typically can increase or decrease the total 
amount of services provided to all consumers by varying the amount 
of resources put into producing any particular pure public good.  For 
example, even though lighthouse owners cannot vary the amount of 
lighthouse services provided on a customer-by-customer basis, they 
can alter the total services provided to all customers by increasing the 
lighthouse’s height or its brightness.  Similarly, although the govern-
ment cannot provide strategic defense to one household without si-
multaneously providing it to all neighboring households, it can in-
crease the amount of strategic defense provided by increasing the size 
of the defense forces or by investing more resources on equipment 
and training. 
Copyrighted works are often described as being indivisible in pre-
cisely this manner.104  For example, although film studios or record 
companies may vary the amount of resources devoted to producing 
any particular movie or song, once the work has been completed, all 
viewers and listeners of that movie or song must necessarily consume a 
product of the same magnitude.  Similarly, software developers can 
vary the amount of resources to increase or decrease the level of so-
phistication of any particular software package.  Once that level has 
been set, however, all users necessarily consume a software package of 
the same size.105
At first glance, the assertion that copyrighted works are indivisible 
may appear to be inconsistent with the fact that different people pur-
chase different numbers of copies of particular works.  For example, 
some customers opt to see a particular movie multiple times, while 
others choose to view it only once.  Similarly, some users may pur-
chase multiple copies of a particular software package, while others 
may purchase only a single copy. 
104 1 PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT § 1.14.1, at 1:45 (2d ed. 1996); Arrow, supra
note 1, at 615; J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms,
94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2434 n.1, 2442 n.43 (1994). 
105 Of course, developers may choose to market different versions of the same 
software package.  As a formal matter, new versions based on the original program are 
more properly regarded as derivative works that are conceptually distinct from the 
original.  On a more general level, versioning is probably best understood as a way to 
separate the intensity of different consumers’ preferences than as introducing a degree 
of divisibility. 
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The key to unraveling this conundrum is to keep in mind the dis-
tinction between the creative expression itself and the medium in 
which it is stored.  Copyright protects only the former.106  The intan-
gible aspects of the creative expression that is the copyrightable work 
are nondepletable, in that one can make an infinite number of copies 
of it without reducing the supply available for consumption by others.  
Recognizing that copyright protects only the intangible aspects of a 
creative work also makes it easier to characterize copyrighted works as 
indivisible, since nothing prevents the same intangible property from 
appearing as an argument in more than one consumer’s consumption 
function.  In addition, the resources that went into producing that in-
tangible component are necessarily the same for all consumers of the 
creative work. 
Thus, even though some consumers may choose not to read, view, 
use, or listen to the entirety of a particular work, while other consum-
ers may choose to obtain multiple copies of the same work, the magni-
tude of the intangible property that each consumes (as measured by 
the number of resources that went into producing it) is precisely the 
same.  The fact that some consumers choose to purchase multiple 
copies is better regarded as an indication of the intensity of their 
preference for the copyrighted work rather than consumption of a 
different quantity.  And as we shall see, the fact that the pure public 
good is an input rather than a finished good does not materially affect 
the analysis.107
 The process of deriving the market demand curve for pure public 
goods differs starkly from the process for deriving the market demand 
curve for private goods.  Figure 3 depicts both Adam’s and Beth’s de-
mand curves for a particular movie, represented by and  re-





106 See 17 U.S.C. § 202 (2000) (“Ownership of a copyright, or of any of the exclu-
sive rights under a copyright, is distinct from ownership of any material object in which 
the work is embodied.”); H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, supra note 54, at 124, reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5739 (“The principle restated in section 202 is a fundamental and 
important one:  that copyright ownership and ownership of a material object in which 
the work is embodied are entirely separate things.”).  The fact that copyright does not 
attach until the work is fixed in a tangible medium of expression, 17 U.S.C. § 101, does 
not alter the fact that copyright protects only the intangible property. 
107 See infra notes 112-115 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 3:  Aggregation of Demand for Pure Public Goods  
(Vertical Summation)
m per year 























produced (as determined by the number of resources used to pro-
duce it) (m)108 and the vertical axis (Pm) depicting the price of the 
108 The quantities depicted along the horizontal axis in Figure 3 differ from the 
quantities depicted on the horizontal axis in Figure 2.  In Figure 2, the horizontal axis 
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movie.  When everyone consumes exactly the same quantity of goods, 
deriving the market demand curve requires adding together the 
prices that each consumer would be willing to pay for a given quantity.  
For example, Adam is willing to pay  and Beth is willing to pay 
for a pure public good of a particular size.  Their total willingness to 
pay for that public good is therefore .  Thus, unlike the mar-
ket demand curve for private goods, which represents the horizontal
summation of the individual consumers’ demand curves, the market 
demand curve for pure public goods (represented by ) is the ver-







equilibrium can again be derived by superimposing a supply curve 
onto the market demand curve, which leads to an equilibrium quan-
tity of m*.  At this quantity, Adam’s willingness to pay is , while 
Beth’s willingness to pay is , creating a total market demand of 
.  Again, there is no reason to assume that Adam and Beth 
will place the same value on the good.  The difference in the intensity 










The efficiency of this equilibrium can, again, be analyzed in terms 
of marginal rates of substitution.  Assuming as before that the price of 
oranges is $1,  represents Adam’s marginal rate of substitution of 
movies for oranges ( ), and  represents Beth’s marginal rate 
of substitution of movies for oranges ( ).  The equilibrium total 
market price ( ) thus equals .  From the 
standpoint of production, the total market price still represents the 


















stead of having the marginal rate of transformation equal each indi-
vidual consumer’s marginal rate of substitution ( ),
as was the case in the equilibrium for private goods, the equilibrium 
for pure public goods requires that the marginal rate of transforma-
tion equal the sum of each individual consumer’s marginal rate of sub-















depicts the allocation of a particular private good.  In Figure 3, the horizontal axis de-
picts the total amount produced of a particular public good.  The allocations of the 
particular quantity of public goods produced are depicted vertically. 
109 See Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition, supra note 6, at 353-54 (“[W]e must in 
the case of public goods add different individuals’ curves vertically.”).  Samuelson ac-
knowledged that this insight was first identified by Howard Bowen.  Samuelson, Pure 
Theory, supra note 6, at 388; see also BOWEN, SOCIAL ECONOMY, supra note 103, at 176-78 
& n.5; Bowen, Voting, supra note 103, at 30-31 & n.3. 
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This has become known as the Samuelson condition and constitutes 
the key distinction between public and private goods.110
The optimal provision of pure public goods represents an interest-
ing inversion of the situation with respect to private goods.  For pri-
vate goods, individual consumers pay the same price and signal the in-
tensity of their preferences by consuming different quantities.  For pure 
public goods, conversely, individuals consume the same quantity and 
signal the intensity of their preferences by paying different prices.
The fact that individual consumers must signal the value that they 
place on pure public goods through prices rather than quantities has 
a dramatic effect on the likelihood that markets will produce and allo-
cate pure public goods in an efficient manner.  Because optimality for 
pure public goods requires that all consumers purchase the same 
quantity and pay their marginal valuations, individual consumers have 
strategic incentives to understate the value that they place on the pure 
public good in the hope that other consumers will bear a larger share 
of the costs.111
Samuelson regarded this inability to induce consumers to reveal 
truthfully the intensity of their preferences as the true source of the 
systematic bias toward underproduction of public goods.  Later theo-
rists have employed game theory to evaluate the severity of the under-
production.  Under these models, each consumer accepts the spillover 
benefits created by the conjectured level of spending by other con-
sumers on the pure public good and then adds additional funds of 
her own until the marginal benefits of further increases in expendi-
ture equal the marginal cost.  From this process, one can construct 
each consumer’s best response function for any conjectured level of 
spending by other consumers.  These best response functions can be 
combined to identify the resulting Nash equilibrium.  Because each 
consumer individually equates her own marginal rate of substitution 
to the marginal rate of transformation (rather than the aggregation of 
the marginal rates of substitution of all consumers), the total level of 
spending necessarily falls short of the levels needed to satisfy the 
Samuelson condition.112  Experimental evidence has confirmed the 
110 See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
111 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 336; Samuelson, Diagrammatic Exposition,
supra note 6, at 355; Samuelson, Pure Theory, supra note 6, at 388. 
112 See, e.g., CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 26-30, 153-61; Richard Cornes & 
Todd Sandler, Easy Riders, Joint Production, and Public Goods, 94 ECON. J. 580, 584-91 
(1984).
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existence of this tendency.113  Interestingly, it is always rational for in-
dividual consumers to contribute some amount toward provision of 
the pure public good regardless of the spending levels that they as-
sume that other consumers will contribute.  Because in equilibrium 
consumers make suboptimal contributions toward production of the 
public good rather than zero contribution—and to distinguish it from 
the systematic bias toward underproduction associated with nonex-
cludability—the literature refers to this effect as “easy riding” rather 
than “free riding.”114
The fact that many copyrightable works are not final goods, but 
instead must be combined with other inputs before they can be sold 
to consumers does not fundamentally change the analysis.  The out-
come still must satisfy the Samuelson condition, although the condi-
tion is modified so that the marginal rate of transformation must 
equal the sum of the marginal valuations of the firms that wish to use 
the good as an input rather than the sum of the marginal rates of sub-
stitution of the consumers who wish to consume the good as an end 
product.115  In short, the same incentives to misrepresent the intensity 
of one’s preferences remain. 
C. Critique of the Conventional Approach 
1.  A New Perspective on Nonexcludability 
Refocusing the analysis around the fundamental principles distin-
guishing public goods from private goods sheds new light on the role 
played by nonexcludability.  The Samuelson condition underscores 
the extent to which the easy riding associated with indivisibility repre-
sents a problem that is analytically distinct from the free riding associ-
ated with nonexcludability.  As noted earlier, the Samuelson condi-
tion requires that consumers each pay their full marginal valuation of 
the public good.  However, consumers of pure public goods have no 
incentive to reveal the true intensity of their preferences.  This incen-
113 For reviews of the literature, see DOUGLAS D. DAVIS & CHARLES A. HOLT, EX-
PERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 317-75 (1993); John O. Ledyard, Public Goods:  A Survey of Ex-
perimental Research, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS 111, 122-69 (John H. 
Kagel & Alvin E. Roth eds., 1995). 
114 See, e.g., CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 30; Cornes & Sandler, supra note 
112, at 580 n.2. 
115 Keimei Kaizuka, Public Goods and Decentralization of Production, 47 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 118, 118 (1965); Oakland, supra note 1, at 493-94; Agnar Sandmo, Optimality 
Rules for the Provision of Collective Factors of Production, 1 J. PUB. ECON. 149, 153 (1972). 
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tive incompatibility remains even if the good is rendered completely 
excludable. 
Restated in terms of the Samuelson condition, complete exclud-
ability does not alter the fact that indivisibility requires the vertical 
summation of demand curves, which in turn requires that the mar-
ginal rate of transformation equal the sum of every consumer’s mar-
ginal rate of substitution.  This vertical summation gives consumers 
the incentive to understate the intensity of their preferences even if 
the good is completely excludable.  Certainly, nonexcludability would 
worsen the problems of underproduction, and the prospect that con-
sumers might enjoy benefits without having to pay for them would 
dampen investment incentives.  But the incentive and opportunity to 
easy ride would remain even if the free riding from nonexcludability 
were completely eliminated. 
Viewing the problem posed by pure public goods in this manner 
reveals why Samuelson did not regard rendering a good excludable as 
sufficient to eliminate the problems associated with market provision 
of public goods.116  This posture also explains why many theorists have 
questioned whether nonexcludability is properly regarded as an essen-
tial feature of pure public goods.117  The fundamental problem that 
lies at the heart of public good economics will thus remain no matter 
how much technological development and innovation in institutional 
forms increase the excludability of copyrightable works. 
2.  A New Perspective on Nonrivalry as Zero Marginal Cost 
Returning to the fundamentals of public good economics also 
helps illuminate the analytical deficiencies associated with modeling 
nonrivalry as zero marginal cost.  As noted earlier, the feature gener-
ally recognized as distinguishing public goods from private goods is 
the fact that efficient provision of public goods must satisfy the 
Samuelson condition: MRS = MRT.  The left-hand side of the equa-
tion, which requires the summation of the marginal rates of substitu-
tion of all consumers, is the source of the incentive incompatibility 
that causes markets for public goods to fail.  The market failure in-
herent in the left-hand side of the Samuelson condition exists regard-
less of whether marginal cost is zero.  Indeed, one could easily incor-
porate a nonzero marginal cost function into the right-hand side of 
116 See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
117 See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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the Samuelson condition, either by building it in to the marginal rate 
of transformation or by adding a term to reflect increasing marginal 
cost.  Doing so would not alleviate the difficulties in inducing con-
sumers to reveal their preferences inherent in the left-hand side of the 
equation.  In short, the incentive for consumers to misrepresent the 
intensity of their preferences will persist regardless of the exact nature 
of the production function and is thus independent of the problems 
that arise when marginal cost is zero. 
For this reason, Samuelson emphasized that marginal cost pricing 
is only one of several necessary conditions for the efficient provision 
of public goods.  Even if the shortfall in production associated with 
the zero marginal cost problem were eliminated (such as by directly 
subsidizing production), the Samuelson condition would still require 
the ability to discern each customer’s marginal valuation of further 
increases in the public good.118
3.  The Proper Scope of Price Discrimination 
Reconceiving public good economics in terms of the Samuelson 
condition provides new insights into the role of price discrimination.  
First, the quantity range over which price discrimination is relevant 
differs depending on whether nonrivalry is modeled as zero marginal 
cost or as indivisibility.  As noted earlier and as depicted in Figure 1, 
the efficiency loss when nonrivalry is modeled as zero marginal costs 
results from the exclusion of consumers represented by the difference 
between Q mon or Q sus and Q eff .   Price discrimination can solve this 
problem by permitting authors to attract those customers by offering 
them lower prices without also having to offer those lower prices to 
existing customers.  Thus, when nonrivalry is modeled as zero mar-
ginal cost, economic efficiency only requires that price discrimination 
be effective over the range running from Q mon or Q sus to  
Q eff .
119  It does not matter whether producers are able to exercise per-
fect price discrimination over inframarginal consumers (those con-
sumers represented by the range of output running from the origin to 
Q mon or Q sus), since only the behavior of the inefficiently excluded 
consumers is critical for economic efficiency. 
118 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 336. 
119 Indeed, this suggests that price discrimination need not be perfect throughout 
the entire range between Q sus and Q eff .   Price discrimination can be imperfect so long 
as it still permits the consumer with the lowest valuation to purchase the good. 
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This conclusion contrasts sharply with the policy implications that 
arise when nonrivalry is viewed through the lens of the Samuelson 
condition.  The Samuelson condition requires that the marginal rate 
of transformation equal the sum of the marginal valuations of all con-
sumers and not just the marginal consumer.  Thus, if a profit-
maximizing producer of a pure public good is expected to produce 
efficient levels of the good, she must be able to charge every con-
sumer a price precisely calibrated to the particular consumer’s incre-
mental valuation.  In other words, in order to satisfy the Samuelson 
condition, the producer must be able to price discriminate over the 
entire range of output and not just with respect to those consumers 
who would be inefficiently excluded by an author’s decision to charge 
a price that exceeds marginal cost. 
This represents a fairly dramatic expansion of the range over 
which price discrimination is important.  This expansion in turn 
places greater importance on facilitating price discrimination with re-
spect to all customers.  It also contradicts suggestions that alternative 
institutional arrangements that facilitate low-value users’ ability to ac-
cess copyrighted works can serve as equally effective substitutes for 
price discrimination.120
The second insight is that, contrary to the claims of the conven-
tional approach, price discrimination need not be perfect in order to 
maximize welfare.  The Samuelson condition implies that optimality 
does not require that producers capture all of the consumer surplus.  
It is sufficient if they are able to appropriate the marginal rate at 
which each consumer would substitute further expansion of the pub-
lic good for other goods.  Indeed, this suggests that permitting com-
petitive producers to engage in perfect price discrimination would 
lead to overproduction of the public good.121  Interestingly, the ten-
dency toward overproduction that exists under perfect price discrimi-
nation by competitive producers of a pure public good disappears 
when the producer engaging in perfect price discrimination is a mo-
nopolist.  Because the marginal revenue curve implicit in the industry 
demand curve is  MRS,  a profit-maximizing monopolist would pro-
120 See supra note 37 and accompanying text. 
121 See Thompson, supra note 18, at 6.  For surveys of this literature, see CORNES &
SANDLER, supra note 1, at 243-55; Oakland, supra note 1, at 515-17, 520-22. 
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duce where the marginal revenue equals the marginal rate of trans-
formation, which would, of course, satisfy the Samuelson condition.122
That said, both perfect price discrimination and the appropria-
tion of the aggregate marginal valuations of all consumers implicit in 
the Samuelson condition require complete information about every 
consumer’s reservation price.  They also require a pricing mechanism 
that is capable of extracting the entirety of that reservation price from 
each consumer and preventing consumers from using arbitrage to de-
feat that pricing regime.  Under the more conventional assumptions 
that information and pricing mechanisms are imperfect, the bias to-
ward underproduction reemerges123 and is more severe under mo-
nopoly provision than under competitive provision.124
III. THE THEORY OF IMPURE PUBLIC GOODS
One of the first criticisms leveled at Samuelson’s work was that 
public and private goods represent idealized polar cases and that most 
real-world cases lay somewhere in between.125  The literature on “im-
pure public goods” emerged from these criticisms, as scholars began 
to explore intermediate cases between private goods and pure public 
goods.  The predominance of Musgrave’s two-part definition of pure 
public goods has naturally led commentators to identify and catego-
rize these intermediate cases by relaxing the elements of that defini-
tion.126  As a result, many theorists segregate impure public goods into 
two categories:  those that remain nonrival but are excludable and 
those that remain nonexcludable but are rival.127  This approach 
122 Thompson, supra note 18, at 7.  For an earlier, less technical discussion that 
makes a similar point, see James M. Buchanan, Public Goods in Theory and Practice:  A 
Note on the Minasian-Samuelson Debate, 10 J.L. & ECON. 193, 195 (1967). 
123 See William H. Oakland, Public Goods, Perfect Competition, and Underproduction, 82 
J. POL. ECON. 927, 937-38 (1974) (concluding that competitive production of public 
goods leads to underproduction). 
124 For comparisons of competitive and monopolistic solutions, see Geoffrey Bren-
nan & Cliff Walsh, A Monopoly Model of Public Goods Provision:  The Uniform Pricing Case,
71 AM. ECON. REV. 196, 201-02 (1981); Dagobert L. Brito & William H. Oakland, On the 
Monopolistic Provision of Excludable Public Goods, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 691, 701-02 (1980). 
125 See supra notes 14-17 and accompanying text. 
126 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
127 For examples of this approach, see MUSGRAVE & MUSGRAVE, supra note 30, at 
50-51; Eyal Benvenisti, Collective Action in the Utilization of Shared Freshwater:  The Chal-
lenges of International Water Resources Law, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 384, 388 (1996); Peter Eck-
ersley, Virtual Markets for Virtual Goods:  The Mirror Image of Digital Copyright?, 18 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 85, 117 (2004); Brett M. Frischmann, An Economic Theory of Infrastructure 
and Commons Management, 89 MINN. L. REV. 917, 942-43 (2005); Inge Kaul et al., Defin-
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makes the manner in which nonrivalry is characterized of critical im-
portance because this characterization necessarily limits the ways in 
which we can regard goods as impure public goods. 
Refocusing the analysis on the Samuelson condition fundamen-
tally reframes the way we think about impure public goods.  For ex-
ample, the most highly developed literature on impure public goods is 
the study of “club goods” and “local public goods.”  These goods differ 
from pure public goods in two important ways.  First, the shared good 
is assumed to be excludable.  Second, the shared good is subject to 
congestion, in that the utility enjoyed by each consumer decreases as 
the total number of people consuming the good rises.128
As we shall see, introducing congestion costs does not prevent the 
same quantity from appearing as an argument in multiple purchasers’ 
consumption functions or allow purchasers to consume different 
quantities.  As a result, impure public goods must still satisfy a form of 
the Samuelson condition.  Thus, problems of incentive compatibility 
remain, notwithstanding the introduction of congestion costs.  It is for 
this reason that the literature concludes that the introduction of con-
gestion costs does not eliminate the essential problem posed by public 
good economics.129
Strictly speaking, then, congestion is not a relaxation of the as-
sumption that goods are nonrival.  Instead, congestion is more prop-
erly regarded as a new dimension along which utility can vary that is 
distinct from both price and quantity.  Thus, rather than being re-
garded as a factor that causes variation in the quantity of a public 
good, congestion is more accurately regarded as a factor that causes 
variation in the quality of a public good.130
Reconceptualizing the study of impure public goods in this man-
ner yields two distinct insights.  First, it expands the range of goods 
that can properly be regarded as impure public goods to include any 
that vary in quality.  For this reason, the leading overview of public 
good economics describes impure public goods not as a spectrum 
ing Global Public Goods, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN 
THE 21ST CENTURY 2, 5 (Inge Kaul et al. eds., 1999). 
128 For surveys of the literature on the economics of congestion, see CORNES &
SANDLER, supra note 1, at 272-77, 347-479; Oakland, supra note 1, at 499-509; Yoo, supra
note 17, at 1863-74. 
129 See Oakland, supra note 1, at 499. 
130 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 348; Eitan Berglas & David Pines, Clubs,
Local Public Goods and Transportation Models:  A Synthesis, 15 J. PUB. ECON. 141, 148 
(1981); Oakland, supra note 1, at 499; Suzanne Scotchmer, Two-Tier Pricing of Shared 
Facilities in a Free-Entry Equilibrium, 16 RAND J. ECON. 456, 467 (1985). 
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along which individual assumptions are relaxed, but rather as a “catch 
all term for any goods not purely public or private.”131  In particular, 
recharacterizing impure public goods in this manner illuminates the 
connection between public goods theory and the literature on prod-
uct differentiation, which models variations in quality explicitly. 
Second, and even more importantly, introducing a new dimension 
distinct from price and quantity provides a new means through which 
consumers can signal the intensity of their preferences.  Indeed, as 
Tiebout noted, variations in quality create the possibility of de facto 
markets in which consumers reveal the intensity of their preferences 
by reallocating their purchases from one provider to another even 
when they are unable to reveal their preferences through quantity and 
are unwilling to reveal their preferences through price.132  In the 
process, the introduction of another consideration that is incentive 
compatible raises the possibility of equilibria in which the Samuelson 
condition may be satisfied notwithstanding the fact that goods remain 
indivisible.  As a result, efficient market provision of impure public 
goods becomes quite feasible,133 a conclusion that contrasts sharply 
with the policy implications of the theory of pure public goods. 
To say that efficient equilibria for impure public goods are feasi-
ble is not to say that they are inevitable.  The efficiency of the result-
ing equilibria ultimately turns on the shape of the relevant quality 
function.  In fact, markets for impure public goods can provide incen-
tives for entry that are either too weak or too strong.134  The maximiza-
tion of economic welfare would thus require varying the strength of 
copyright protection on a case-by-case basis in a way that reflects the 
precise quality function associated with each good.  The question then 
becomes whether conducting such fact-specific inquiries is advisable. 
The balance of this Part is organized as follows.  Section A dis-
cusses the literature on impure public goods that draws on the eco-
nomics of congestion.  After laying out the basic insights of the litera-
ture, it considers and ultimately rejects the possibility that the 
economics of congestion might serve as the basis for modeling copy-
right.  Section B analyzes the literature on impure public goods that 
draws on the economics of product differentiation, showing how spa-
131 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 4-5. 
132 Tiebout, supra note 17, at 419-20, 424. 
133 See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
134 For arguments that there is no “invisible hand” guiding markets for impure 
public goods, see supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
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tial competition can provide new insights into the basic policy issues 
confronting copyright. 
A.  The Economics of Congestion 
1.  A Basic Description of the Economics of Congestion 
The first self-conscious attempt to explore when markets might ef-
ficiently provide public goods was offered by Charles Tiebout, who 
proposed a model of local public goods in which residents shared a 
resource that was in fixed supply and for which there was an optimal 
level of use.135  Shortly thereafter, James Buchanan offered his theory 
of club goods as a way to explore the intermediate cases that exist be-
tween the polar extremes of pure public goods and private goods.136
Samuelson acknowledged the connection between these theories and 
his theory of pure public goods, but questioned whether these alter-
native approaches could ever be rendered feasible.137  For purposes 
relevant to this Article, the analysis of club goods is indistinguishable 
from the analysis of local public goods.138
Club goods differ from the classic definition of pure public goods 
in two ways.  First, though exclusion may be costly, club goods are fully 
excludable.  Second, they are subject to congestion.  In other words, 
while the jointness of supply always permits an additional consumer to 
enjoy the shared facility, increasing the number of consumers imposes 
congestion costs on existing users.139  Although it is sometimes de-
scribed as rendering a good partially nonrival,140 congestion does not 
prevent the same quantity from appearing as an argument in more 
than one consumer’s consumption function.  Instead, congestion in-
troduces a new, quality-oriented dimension—distinct from price and 
135 Tiebout, supra note 17, at 419. 
136 Buchanan, supra note 17, at 1-2.  Mancur Olson also expounded a theory of 
club goods at roughly the same time as Buchanan.  MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF 
COLLECTIVE ACTION 22-43 (1965).  For a review of the early history of club goods the-
ory, see CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 351-54. 
137 See supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
138 Oakland, supra note 1, at 502-03; see also CORNES & SADLER, supra note 1, at 366-
68 (finding club good theory analogous to local public good theory and identifying 
key differences).  In the discussion that follows, references to “club goods” are in-
tended to encompass both theories. 
139 Buchanan, supra note 17, at 3-5.  Although Tiebout does not use the term 
“congestion,” his assumption of the existence of a resource with a “U”-shaped average 
cost curve is consistent with the concept.  Tiebout, supra note 17, at 419. 
140 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 9; Frischmann, supra note 127, at 952-53. 
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quantity—that can serve as a source of variation in the utility derived 
by individual consumers. 
This suggests that providing the efficient number of club goods 
still requires satisfying a form of the Samuelson condition.141  In this 





where  represents each individual’s marginal rate of substitu-
tion between the club good, m, and an outside private good, o, and 
where  represents the marginal rate of transformation of the 
club good and the outside private good.  The left-hand side of this 
equation can be interpreted as the incremental consumer benefits 
from further increases in the size of the club good.  The right-hand 
side of the equation represents the marginal cost of such increases, 
which is the incremental cost of expanding the club good less the ag-
gregate decongestion benefits of expanding the capacity.  This condi-
tion requires that production of club goods be expanded until the ag-
gregate marginal benefits from further increases in size no longer 




Properly speaking, then, congestion does not introduce a degree 
of rivalry.  The same quantity can still appear as an argument in more 
than one customer’s consumption function, and optimality still re-
quires satisfying the Samuelson condition.  The addition of the con-
gestion term also does nothing to eliminate the vertical summation of 
the marginal rates of substitution, which is the source of the incentive 
incompatibility that represents the core problem associated with pub-
lic goods.  Instead, congestion is more properly regarded as a consid-
eration that is analytically distinct from rivalry.142
At the same time, the presence of congestion costs introduces a 
second optimality condition.  Unlike pure public goods, for which fur-
ther expansion of the customer base always reduces the costs borne by 
individual consumers,143 expansion of the customer base for club 
141 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 357-58; Eitan Berglas, On the Theory of 
Clubs, 66 AM. ECON. REV. 116, 117, 119 (1976); Robin Boadway, A Note on the Market 
Provision of Club Goods, 13 J. PUB. ECON. 131, 133 (1980); Oakland, supra note 1, at 500, 
503.
142 See supra note 130 and accompanying text. 
143 See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 349 (“The entire population is in a sin-
gle provision association for pure public goods.”); Buchanan, supra note 17, at 1-2 
(noting that for pure public goods, “the optimal sharing group . . . includes an infi-
nitely large number of members”). 
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goods gives rise to a tradeoff.  As with pure public goods, the addition 
of new members reduces average cost by spreading the fixed costs of 
creating the shared resource over a larger membership.144  When a 
public good is subject to congestion, however, increasing club size also 
increases the congestion costs borne by each member.  Congestion 
thus creates a diseconomy of scale, which in turn implies the existence 
of an optimal club size beyond which any further benefits from 
spreading fixed costs over a larger number of members would be off-
set by the costs imposed by increases in congestion.145  It is the pres-
ence of such a diseconomy of scale that prevents markets for public 
goods from collapsing into natural monopolies.146
 For any representative club, membership should be increased so 
long as the marginal benefits that the additional club member would 
derive from  joining the club exceed the increase in congestion costs 
that the additional member would impose on current members.147





where s represents club size, MRSsa represents the marginal rate of 
substitution between increasing club size and additional consumption 
of an outside private good, and MRTsa equals the marginal rate of 
transformation of increasing club size versus producing another unit 
of the outside good.  The left-hand side of the equation can be inter-
preted as the marginal benefits that the club members would enjoy 
from admitting an additional member.  The right-hand side of the 
equation can be interpreted as the marginal (congestion) costs of 
admitting an additional member. 
Unlike the Samuelson condition, this second condition is poten-
tially incentive compatible.  A club can induce its members to act effi-
ciently simply by charging them a membership fee that equals their 
marginal contribution to congestion.  If customers cannot vary the in-
tensity of their use of club facilities, this can be accomplished simply 
by charging a lump-sum membership fee calibrated to the average 
member’s contribution to congestion.148  If the customers can vary the 
144 Buchanan, supra note 17, at 8. 
145 Id. at 7-8. 
146 Yoo, supra note 5, at 232-33, 248-49. 
147 CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 357-58; Berglas, supra note 141, at 117; Bu-
chanan, supra note 17, at 4-5. 
148 See Berglas, supra note 141, at 117 (deriving the optimal solution, assuming 
nonvariable intensity, for a swimming pool). 
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intensity of their use of club facilities, the classic solution is to impose 
a two-part tariff:  one part consisting of a lump-sum membership fee 
designed to extract consumer surplus, and the other part consisting of 
a variable fee calibrated to match the congestion costs imposed by the 
last unit consumed.149
The ability of and incentive for consumers to reallocate their pur-
chases from club to club in response to congestion costs provides a ba-
sis for revealing consumers’ preferences that is distinct from both 
price and quantity.  Clubs that fall below optimal size have the incen-
tive to attract new members, since the benefits of spreading the fixed 
costs needed to maintain the shared resource over a larger number of 
members would offset the increase in congestion costs associated with 
adding new members.  In addition, to the extent that club size ex-
ceeds optimal levels, one would expect members in overly congested 
clubs to exit and start new clubs.150  Eventually, club members should 
redistribute their purchases until the economy is divided into clubs of 
optimal size and the level of congestion is spread equally across all 
clubs.151
Because both club good conditions must be solved simultaneously, 
the addition of the second condition can give rise to equilibria with 
welfare characteristics that are strikingly different from those that pre-
vail under a pure public goods analysis.  Club goods do not exhibit the 
systematic bias toward underproduction associated with pure public 
goods.  Indeed, it is quite feasible that markets will produce the so-
cially optimal number of club goods in equilibrium.  In addition, so 
long as the economy is sufficiently large, equilibrium prices should 
149 For the classic analysis of two-part pricing, see Walter Y. Oi, A Disneyland Di-
lemma:  Two-Part Tariffs for a Mickey Mouse Monopoly, 85 Q.J. ECON. 77, 80-81 (1971).  For 
an early application of two-part pricing to club goods, see Berglas, supra note 141, at 
119 (noting this solution, but concluding that it is inefficient).  A more sophisticated 
model by Suzanne Scotchmer shows that two-part pricing can induce efficient con-
sumption of club resources.  Scotchmer demonstrates that the number of clubs is inef-
ficient for finite economies, but converges to the efficient result as the economy be-
comes increasingly large.  Scotchmer, supra note 130, at 462-65.  This solution assumes 
the absence of transaction costs.  But see Yoo, supra note 17, at 1865-66 (reviewing the 
literature relaxing this assumption). 
150 The possibility of entry by new clubs represents one of the characteristics that 
distinguishes club goods from local public goods.  See Scotchmer, supra note 21, at 94 
(briefly discussing costs of entry with respect to clubs as similar to costs of entry with 
respect to producers of private goods). 
151 Berglas, supra note 141, at 117-18; Berglas & Pines, supra note 130, at 154; cf.
Tiebout, supra note 17, at 418-20, 424 (drawing a similar conclusion for local public 
goods).
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closely approximate efficient levels and should converge to marginal 
cost as the economy grows larger.152  Finally, the possibility of entry by 
new clubs effectively guarantees that no club earns supracompetitive 
returns.153  The efficiency of the club goods equilibrium is subject to a 
number of technical caveats,154 but none are central to my argument. 
152 Berglas & Pines, supra note 130, at 146, 156; Scotchmer, supra note 130, at 458, 
463-65, 468. 
153 The indivisibility of the fixed costs of entry may give rise to an “integer prob-
lem,” in which n clubs earn supracompetitive returns, while n + 1 clubs would not.  
That said, the number of clubs in equilibrium will fall short of the optimum by no 
more than one.  So long as the economy is sufficiently large, any supracompetitive re-
turns should also be relatively small.  Berglas, supra note 141, at 118; Scotchmer, supra
note 130, at 464. 
154 For example, a club good equilibrium will prove stable only if dividing the 
overall population of club members by the optimal club size results in an integer.  
When that occurs, every club member lacks the incentive to switch clubs.  The result-
ing equilibrium is said to be in the core, which implies that the equilibrium is Pareto 
optimal.  A noninteger result destabilizes the equilibrium, since those excluded from 
club membership possess the incentive to bid their way into a club by offering to ac-
cept a lower payoff than a current club member.  The result is a constant shuffling of 
club composition.  Berglas & Pines, supra note 130, at 157; Mark V. Pauly, Clubs, Com-
monality, and the Core:  An Integration of Game Theory and the Theory of Public Goods, 34 
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 314, 323-24 (1967).  Fortunately, introduction of a concept known 
as the approximate core renders the nonexistence of a stable equilibrium less problem-
atic than it may seem at first glance.  If the number of club members is large relative to 
the number of nonmembers, club members can make side payments to nonmembers 
in order to induce them not to destabilize the existing coalitions.  So long as the econ-
omy is sufficiently large, the resulting utilities should lie very close to core utilities.  
Scotchmer, supra note 21, at 104-05; Myrna Wooders, The Tiebout Hypothesis:  Near Opti-
mality in Local Public Good Economies, 48 ECONOMETRICA 1467, 1474, 1479-82, 1484 
(1980).
 Another critical assumption is that consumer preferences within each club are 
homogeneous.  See CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 351 (noting that the bulk of 
the literature on club goods has focused on homogeneous clubs).  It has been recog-
nized since Walter Oi’s seminal discussion of two-part pricing that consumer hetero-
geneity can cause two-part prices to become inefficient, since no single, lump-sum fee 
will be sufficient to allow the club to extract all of the available surplus.  Oi, supra note 
149, at 81-88.  To the extent that consumer preferences are heterogeneous, one would 
expect consumers to partition themselves into different clubs consisting of members 
with the same preferences.  CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 1, at 367; Berglas, supra
note 141, at 116, 120; Berglas & Pines, supra note 130, at 152-53; Martin McGuire, 
Group Segregation and Optimal Jurisdictions, 82 J. POL. ECON. 112, 131 (1974); Oakland, 
supra note 1, at 504; Mark V. Pauly, Cores and Clubs, 9 PUB. CHOICE 53, 60-64 (1970).  If 
integer problems prevent the total population from segregating itself into homogene-
ous clubs, individuals with different preferences may have to join together to form a 
mixed club.  Early analyses disputed the optimality of mixed clubs equilibria.  Compare
Berglas & Pines, supra note 130, at 150-51 (concluding that replicating a mixed club is 
nonoptimal), with Todd Sandler & John T. Tschirhart, Mixed Clubs:  Further Observa-
tions, 23 J. PUB. ECON. 381, 388-89 (1984) (arguing that replicating a mixed club is op-
timal under certain circumstances).  Later work has shown that mixed clubs may be 
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This is not to say that congestion costs represent an economic 
panacea.  Because the components of the second efficiency condition 
are not perfectly correlated with the components of the Samuelson 
condition, markets can reach equilibrium with insufficient, excess, or 
optimal entry, depending on the shape of the relevant congestion 
function.  Nonetheless, because the club good equilibrium is no 
longer bounded away from achieving either efficient levels of access 
to the public good or efficient incentives for the creation of the public 
good, the welfare properties of the result are considerably more at-
tractive and open up the policy space in important ways. 
2.  The Applicability to Copyright 
One can conceive of copyrightable works as club goods, where po-
tential purchasers segregate themselves into groups of consumers with 
similar preferences in an effort to economize on fixed costs.155  Wil-
liam Landes and Richard Posner have recently suggested that copy-
righted works may be subject to congestion externalities that cause the 
utility derived from consuming a work to decrease as the total number 
of people consuming the work increases.  Analogizing to how overex-
posure can prematurely exhaust the commercial value of a celebrity’s 
likeness, they argue that additional consumption can depress demand 
for a copyrighted work.156  Although Landes and Posner discuss con-
optimal under certain conditions.  See Suzanne Scotchmer & Myrna Holtz Wooders, 
Competitive Equilibrium and the Core in Club Economies with Anonymous Crowding, 34 J. PUB.
ECON. 159, 171-72 (1987) (finding that the mixed club equilibrium approaches effi-
ciency so long as crowding is anonymous and the economy is large). 
 The efficiency of two-part pricing also depends on the assumption that excluding 
nonmembers and metering club usage are costless.  When transaction costs are taken 
into account, clubs may find it more economical to charge a flat-rate price based on 
the contribution to congestion by the average club member.  Robert J. Barro & Paul M. 
Romer, Ski-Lift Pricing, with Applications to Labor and Other Markets, 77 AM. ECON. REV.
875, 876-79 (1987); Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, Exclusion and the Theory of 
Clubs, 24 CAN. J. ECON. 888, 895-96 (1991).  See generally CORNES & SANDLER, supra note 
1, at 387-90 (surveying the literature on the impact of exclusion costs on club goods).  
Lack of information about the intensity of individual club members’ demand for usage 
of club facilities can give rise to a moral hazard problem, in which members with high 
demand are able to enjoy benefits that exceed what they pay and are able to impose 
costs on club members with relatively low demand.  Kangoh Lee, Transaction Costs and 
Equilibrium Pricing of Congested Public Goods with Imperfect Information, 45 J. PUB. ECON.
337, 359 (1991).  As noted earlier, clubs may avoid transaction costs through a variety 
of alternative institutional forms.  See supra notes 89-92 and accompanying text. 
155 See Besen & Kirby, supra note 23, at 264-70, 280 (discussing the advantages of 
creating purchasing groups to economize on fixed costs). 
156 See Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 484-88. 
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gestion externalities in the context of copyright duration and the 
dangers surrounding the overuse of resources that are unowned, their 
analysis has potential implications for a broader range of copyright-
related issues. 
The ultimate relevance of the congestion externalities for copy-
right is not completely clear.  As an initial matter, there is reason to 
question whether increases in consumption will degrade the quality of 
copyrightable works for those who have already purchased them.  
Concerns about overexposure seem limited to the use of copyrighted 
characters in commercial advertising.157  Indeed, it is quite possible 
that additional exposure would increase the value of the work, either 
by serving as de facto advertising158 or by tapping into solidarity or as-
sociative characteristics.159  The ambiguousness of the impact of these 
external effects has led courts and commentators to reject congestion 
externalities as a source of market failure in the related context of the 
right of publicity.160
Furthermore, the fact that purchasing decisions by one individual 
may have external effects on other purchasers is not always economi-
cally problematic.  Consider the classic case in which marginal cost is 
rising.  Since manufacturers in perfect competition set prices along 
their respective marginal cost curves, any increase in the quantity pro-
duced by a given manufacturer to meet additional demand causes the 
price paid by inframarginal buyers to rise.  It is for this reason that 
Pigou made his famous error in arguing that all markets that did not 
face constant marginal cost needed to be corrected either through 
taxes or subsidies.161
If Pigou’s reasoning were correct, the near universality of noncon-
stant marginal cost would make government intervention in the econ-
157 Michael Abramowicz, An Industrial Organization Approach to Copyright Law, 46 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 33, 85 (2004). 
158 Id. at 84. 
159 Netanel, supra note 35, at 1907-09.  For more general analyses of solidarity 
goods, see H. Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumers’ 
Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 190-99 (1950); Cass R. Sunstein & Edna Ullmann-Margalit, 
Solidarity Goods, 9 J. POL. PHIL. 129 (2001). 
160 Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 95 F.3d 959, 975 (10th 
Cir. 1996); Mathews v. Wozencraft, 15 F.3d 432, 439 (5th Cir. 1994); Michael Madow, 
Private Ownership of Public Image:  Popular Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REV.
125, 222-23 n.445 (1993); Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and the Right of Publicity, 40 
HOUS. L. REV. 903, 911 n.32 (2003). 
161 Pigou first advanced this argument in A.C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE 177-
78 (1912). 
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omy endemic.  The problem is that the external effects that Pigou 
identified are what we now understand to be pecuniary externalities—
external effects that are fully integrated into market mechanisms.162
Returning to the example of rising marginal cost introduced above, 
the increase in price resulting from an increase in the quantity pro-
duced simply transfers surplus from one market actor to another.  
Thus, when markets are functioning well, pecuniary externalities are 
fully internalized by market transactions.  Such externalities may 
transfer wealth, but they have no impact on efficiency.163  As a result, 
they are not properly regarded as the type of externality that leads to 
market failure.  On the contrary, this type of market-mediated exter-
nal effect is a necessary feature of a properly functioning market.164
162 See Jacob Viner, Cost Curves and Supply Curves, 3 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR NATIONALÖK-
ONOMIE 23 (1931), reprinted in READINGS IN PRICE THEORY 198 (George J. Stigler & 
Kenneth E. Boulding eds., 1952) (establishing the distinction between pecuniary and 
technological externalities).  For critiques in the same vein, see, for example, Howard 
S. Ellis & William Fellner, External Economies and Diseconomies, 33 AM. ECON. REV. 493, 
494-503 (1943); F.H. Knight, Some Fallacies in the Interpretation of Social Cost, 38 Q.J.
ECON. 582, 584-92 (1924); Tibor Scitovsky, Two Concepts of External Economies, 62 J. POL.
ECON. 143, 146 (1954).  For recent discussions, see John F. Duffy, Intellectual Property 
Isolationism and the Average Cost Thesis, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1077, 1081-83 (2005); S.J. Lie-
bowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market Failure?, 17 
RES. LAW & ECON. 1, 4-10 (1995). 
163 See, e.g., William J. Baumol, On Taxation and the Control of Externalities, 62 AM.
ECON. REV. 307, 312 n.8 (1972) (noting the “well known” proposition that “pecuniary 
externalities do not lead to resource misallocation”); Bruce C. Greenwald & Joseph E. 
Stiglitz, Externalities in Economies with Imperfect Information and Incomplete Markets, 101 Q.J.
ECON. 229, 229 (1986) (noting that “pecuniary externalities by themselves are not a 
source of inefficiency”); Louis Makowski & Joseph M. Ostroy, Appropriation and Effi-
ciency:  A Revision of the First Theorem of Welfare Economics, 85 AM. ECON. REV. 808, 824 
(1995) (“The moral drawn from Pigou’s error was that pecuniary externalities should 
be distinguished from welfare-relevant ownership externalities.”).  When markets are 
not functioning well, pecuniary externalities do not necessarily lead to efficiency.  
Even though market transactions tend to internalize pecuniary externalities, the exis-
tence of other market imperfections may cause the resulting equilibrium to be ineffi-
cient.  This theoretical result is not thought to provide any general policy implications.  
The magnitude and direction of the effect of both the market imperfections and the 
pecuniary externalities are ambiguous.  Absent some reason to think that either would 
bias the market in a particular direction, there is no reason to believe that internaliz-
ing pecuniary externalities would yield systematic benefits.  See Lee Hsien Loong & 
Richard Zeckhauser, Pecuniary Externalities Do Matter When Contingent Claims Markets Are 
Incomplete, 97 Q.J. ECON. 171, 171-79 (1982) (arguing that while pecuniary externalities 
lead to inefficiencies where markets are incomplete, the direction of that inefficiency 
cannot be predicted). 
164 Therefore, the parallels that Besen and Kirby drew between their model and a 
club goods model are not completely apt.  The diseconomies of scale in the Besen and 
Kirby model arose from the assumption that marginal cost was increasing.  Besen & 
Kirby, supra note 23, at 257.  Since increasing marginal cost is fully internalized in the 
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Technological externalities, in contrast, are effects that are external to 
the parties to the transactions and thus are not mediated through a 
price mechanism, such as occurs when pollution imposes costs on 
neighbors that are not reflected in the polluter’s costs or revenue.  As 
such, technological externalities can lead to market failure, although, 
as Coase pointed out, the parties can internalize any externality so 
long as a market exists in which the parties can bargain around the 
problem and the transaction costs are not so high as to prevent the 
parties from reaching agreement.165
As Landes and Posner note, determining whether a change in 
value associated with congestion externalities is the result of techno-
logical or pecuniary externalities can be difficult, if not impossible.166
On the one hand, a drop in value associated with an increase in con-
sumption might be the result of a technological externality that oper-
ates outside of the market.  The correction for this problem would be 
straightforward:  create a property right to cover all uses in order to 
facilitate the creation of the missing market needed to internalize the 
technological externality.  On the other hand, a drop in value associ-
ated with an increase in consumption might instead be the result of a 
pecuniary externality.  For example, an author whose copyright gave it 
a true monopoly would set price and output to maximize its profits.  
By necessary implication, any deviation in output would cause a reduc-
tion in value.  In that case, the reduction in value from further in-
creases in output would not be the result of a technological externality 
in need of potential redress, but rather would be an inframarginal ef-
fect completely mediated by the monopolist’s ability to set price so as 
to maximize its profits. 
The difficulty is that decreases in value as consumption increases 
are consistent with either scenario.  Absent additional information, 
one cannot determine whether any reduction in value stems from a 
technological externality or a pecuniary externality, such as a devia-
tion from the profit-maximizing quantity or a reduction in price in 
the face of declining average costs.167  There is thus reason to doubt 
price mechanism, the price increase for other consumers associated with movement 
along the marginal cost curve is more properly considered a pecuniary externality fully 
internalized by the market, rather than a technological externality that can create 
market failure. 
165 See supra note 88 and accompanying text. 
166 Landes & Posner, supra note 52, at 486-88. 
167 See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 162, at 7-9 (advancing a similar argument 
in the related context of network economic effects).
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whether increases in consumption of copyrighted works will in fact 
decrease the quality enjoyed by those who have already purchased 
such works and whether courts will be able to determine with any cer-
tainty whether any such decreases would be the result of technological 
rather than pecuniary externalities.  The absence of any reliable way 
for making these determinations limits the utility of applying the club 
goods branch of the theory of impure public goods as a tool for ana-
lyzing copyright. 
B. Spatial Competition 
What is less well recognized is that the economics of impure pub-
lic goods can also be modeled through an approach pioneered by Ho-
telling known as spatial competition.168  Under spatial competition, 
goods are completely excludable, and producers vie for business not 
on the basis of price, but rather by choosing a location along a linear 
geographic space.169  At the same time, transportation costs cause the 
utility derived by each customer to vary.  If the revenue captured by a 
producer exceeds its costs, the supracompetitive returns attract entry 
by new producers.  The consumers who are located the closest to the 
new entrant reallocate their purchases to the new producer in an ef-
fort to minimize their transportation costs.  Absent sunk costs in loca-
tion, incumbent producers accommodate the new entrant by shifting 
their positions until they are spread evenly across the geographic 
space.  This process reaches equilibrium when consumers can no 
longer reduce their transportation costs by reallocating their pur-
chases to another producer and entry has dissipated all of the avail-
able supracompetitive returns.170
168 Harold Hotelling, Stability in Competition, 39 ECON. J. 41 (1929). 
169 The discussion that follows extends my previous analysis of the implications of 
spatial competition for copyright.  Yoo, supra note 5, at 241-46, 260-72.  For overviews 
of the literature on spatial competition, see JOHN BEATH & YANNIS KATSOULACOS, THE 
ECONOMIC THEORY OF PRODUCT DIFFERENTIATION 11-34 (1991); Eaton & Lipsey, supra
note 22, at 734-61; Jean J. Gabszewicz & Jacques-François Thisse, Location, in 1 HAND-
BOOK OF GAME THEORY WITH ECONOMIC APPLICATIONS 281 (Robert J. Aumann & Ser-
giu Hart eds., 1992).  For a somewhat less technical survey, see JEFFREY CHURCH &
ROGER WARE, INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION: A STRATEGIC APPROACH 379-411 (2000).  
For other analyses drawing the connection between spatial competition and copyright, 
see Abramowicz, supra note 157, at 45-68; Gerald R. Faulhaber, File Sharing, Copyright, 
and the Optimal Production of Music, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 77 (2006), 
available at http://www.mttlr.org/volthirteen/faulhaber.pdf. 
170 The localized nature of competition and the indivisibility of benefits do create 
a limited possibility of sustainable supracompetitive returns.  Such supracompetitive 
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Hotelling himself recognized that the same framework could be 
extended to model competition among products distributed along a 
characteristics space rather than a geographic space.  For example, as 
Hotelling explained, one can envision manufacturers of apple cider as 
deciding where to produce along a spectrum of product characteris-
tics running from sweet to sour.171  In a characteristics space, the de-
cline in utility results not from transportation costs, but rather from a 
particular product’s divergence from each consumer’s ideal product 
characteristics.172
As with other forms of public good economics, spatial competition 
permits the same quantity to appear as an argument in multiple cus-
tomers’ consumption functions.  In addition, the fact that one cus-
tomer consumes a particular quantity necessarily means that others 
must consume the same quantity.  It is for this reason that Samuelson 
saw the connection between public good economics and spatial com-
petition, concluding that they posed nearly identical analytical prob-
lems.173
1.  A Basic Description of Spatial Competition 
The connection between spatial competition and the theory of 
impure public goods is drawn most explicitly in the work of Nobel 
laureate Joseph Stiglitz.  Stiglitz follows Hotelling’s approach by as-
returns should be trivially small so long as the economy is sufficiently “large.”  Yoo, su-
pra note 5, at 240, 244 n.102, 250-51, 279. 
171 Hotelling, supra note 168, at 53-54.  For a listing of other articles drawing the 
same connection, see Richard Schmalensee, Entry Deterrence in the Ready-to-Eat Breakfast 
Cereal Industry, 9 BELL J. ECON. 305, 309 n.7 (1978). 
172 Hotelling, supra note 168, at 54. 
173 Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 336 (invoking Hotelling’s example of spa-
tial competition between sweet and sour cider producers and concluding that such 
competition “is analytically almost exactly like my model of public expenditure”).  For other 
commentators describing spatial competition as a way to model impure public goods, 
see BUCHANAN, supra note 103, at 53-54; Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 309-12.  Spatial com-
petition is related to another form of competition among differentiated products 
known as “monopolistic competition.”  See also EDWARD HASTINGS CHAMBERLIN, THE 
THEORY OF MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION 196-99, 260-65 (8th ed. 1962) (drawing the 
connection between monopolistic competition and spatial competition); BEATH &
KATSOULACOS, supra note 169, at 5-6 (describing spatial competition and monopolistic 
competition as alternative ways to model product differentiation); Eaton & Lipsey, su-
pra note 22, 727-28 (same).  The connection between product differentiation and pub-
lic good economics is further underscored by the fact that economics theorists also re-
gard monopolistic competition as a form of competition among impure public goods.  
See Oakland, supra note 1, at 505; P.A. Samuelson, Pure Theory of Public Expenditure and 
Taxation, in PUBLIC ECONOMICS, supra note 2, at 98, 119. 
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suming that individual consumers are evenly distributed across a lin-
ear geographic space.174  Individuals must incur linear transportation 
costs to travel to the closest producer.175  Entry by another producer 
requires the incurrence of an up-front fixed cost. 
It is tempting to think about transportation costs as analogous to 
congestion costs.  On closer inspection, however, such a characteriza-
tion would be inapt, since in the transportation cost context the addi-
tion of another customer to the purchasing group does not degrade 
the utility derived by existing customers.  The framework advanced in 
this Article suggests that it may be more helpful to think of transporta-
tion as introducing an independent source of variation in utility that is 
distinct from both price and quantity.  Indeed, like Hotelling, Stiglitz 
recognizes that his model can easily be generalized to encompass 
competition among differentiated products that compete by choosing 
a location along a spectrum of product characteristics.176  Spatial com-
petition thus captures the essence of impure public goods theory in 
that access to particular goods is fully excludable, all individuals con-
sume a good of the same magnitude, and variations in quality provide 
a dimension aside from price and quantity along which the utility de-
rived by individual consumers can vary. 
Beginning with the case in which each producer charges a uni-
form price,177 economic efficiency requires the provision of the opti-
174 Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 309-10.  The model of spatial competition described in 
this Article is called a discrete choice model, in which each consumer buys only one of the 
available product varieties and purchases only from the closest provider.  More general 
models can accommodate the possibility that consumers will purchase multiple prod-
ucts from multiple providers.  For examples of such models, see V. Bhaskar & Ted To, 
Is Perfect Price Discrimination Really Efficient?  An Analysis of Free Entry, 35 RAND J. ECON.
762, 767-69 (2004); Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 22, at 751-52.  For further discussion, 
see infra notes 212, 214 and accompanying text. 
175 Stiglitz assumes that transportation costs are linear.  Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 
310.  Later work has shown that they can be nonlinear as well.  See Bhaskar & To, supra
note 174, at 764-65 (offering a general model of spatial competition in which transpor-
tation costs can take a variety of linear and quadratic shapes); C. d’Aspremont et al., 
On Hotelling’s “Stability in Competition”, 47 ECONOMETRICA 1145, 1148-49 (1979) (mod-
eling transportation costs as quadratic); Faulhaber, supra note 169, at 94-95 (offering 
illustrations of differently shaped transportation cost functions in the copyright con-
text).
176 Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 309-10 (recognizing “an obvious slight modification to 
the analysis in which the differences are not with respect to location but with respect to 
preferences for different public goods”). 
177 Stiglitz actually discusses the uniform pricing scenario second and begins his 
analysis by focusing on perfectly discriminating producers.  Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 
310-11.  For purposes of this Article, it makes more sense to discuss these scenarios in 
the reverse order. 
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mal number of spatially competitive goods.  Entry reduces aggregate 
transportation costs, but requires the incurrence of additional fixed 
costs.  Thus, the optimal number of spatially competitive goods occurs 
where the aggregate improvement in utility exactly offsets the cost of 
creating another spatially competitive good.  In other words, as Stiglitz 
points out, the resulting equilibrium must still satisfy the Samuelson 




where MRSmo is the marginal rate of substitution between the impure 
public good, m, and an outside private good, o, and MRTmo is the mar-
ginal rate of transformation of the impure pubic good and the outside 
good.178  The left-hand side represents the aggregate increase in mar-
ginal utility caused by the reduction in transportation costs associated 
with entry by an additional producer.  The right-hand side represents 
the incremental cost of adding an additional producer.179  As with pre-
vious forms of public good competition, the sum of every consumer’s 
marginal rate of substitution of the impure public good must equal 
the marginal rate of transformation.  Thus, the fundamental incentive 
incompatibility problem inherent in public good economics remains. 
Optimality requires not only that the efficient number of goods 
be produced, but also that those goods be efficiently allocated.  Thus, 
spatial competition must also satisfy a second efficiency condition, 
which is analogous to the second condition that applied to club 
goods.180  This condition requires that each producer of a spatially 
competitive good serve additional consumers until the marginal utility 
of providing the good to another person (taking transportation costs 
into account) equals the marginal cost of doing so.181  As was the case 
with club goods and local public goods, decisions about whether to 
178 See id. at 311-12.  In order to remain consistent with the earlier portions of this 
Article, I use notation that differs from Stiglitz’s.  The basic intuitions nonetheless re-
main the same. 
179 As noted earlier, spatial competition differs from the economics of congestion 
in that allowing additional consumers to purchase a good does not degrade the utility 
enjoyed by other consumers of the same good.  As a result, the right-hand side of this 
equation differs from the right-hand side of the equation for club goods in that it does 
not include a term to represent the degradation in quality resulting from congestion. 
180 See supra note 147 and accompanying text. 
181 See Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 312.  Note that Stiglitz’s treatment differs from the 
standard Hotelling set-up in that Stiglitz allows the median purchaser to determine the 
price and the level of provision.  Id. at 311. 
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purchase and from whom to purchase can reflect variations in the util-
ity that different customers derive, which in turn depends on the 
number of producers as well as the shape of the transportation cost 
function.182  Furthermore, consumers have no incentive to misrepre-
sent their preferences, either by purchasing when the transportation 
costs exceed the utility they would derive or by refusing to purchase 
when their marginal utility exceeds the transportation costs they 
would have to bear.  By giving customers the incentive to reveal their 
preferences by reallocating their purchases to different producers, 
spatial competition can thus give rise to de facto markets in much the 
same manner as club goods and local public goods. 
Spatial competition can be depicted graphically, as in Figure 4 be-
low.  In this Figure, consumers are distributed uniformly across a geo-
graphic space, transportation costs are linear, and each consumer 
purchases from the closest producer so long as the transportation 
costs needed to get to the producer’s location do not exceed the util-
ity the consumer would derive from her purchase.183  The dark grey, 
pentagonal region represents the utility of the consumers served by 
each producer.  Entry continues until the revenue captured by a pro-
ducer equals the fixed costs of entry, at which point the market 
reaches equilibrium. 
The result is an interesting inversion of Tiebout’s model of local 
public goods.  Under Tiebout’s approach, the local public good occu-
pies a fixed location, and consumers relocate so as to maximize their 
utility.184  Under the spatial competition approach, the potential  
182 Compare Hotelling, supra note 168, at 53-54 (showing how products exhibit 
minimal differentiation when transportation costs are linear), with d’Aspremont et al., 
supra note 175, at 1148-49 (showing how products exhibit maximal differentiation 
when transportation costs are quadratic).  For an analysis of the level of entry under 
different transportation cost functions, see Bhaskar & To, supra note 174, at 764-66. 
183 By depicting the competition as taking place along an infinite linear product 
space, Figure 4 represents an oversimplification.  If spatial competition were to take 
place along an infinite linear space, no equilibrium would exist since a new entrant 
would always find it possible to enter to the outside of the existing players.  This prob-
lem is usually solved by assuming a finite linear product space, by assuming a circular 
product space, or by assuming sunk costs in location and analyzing the impact of inte-
rior entry.  Figure 4 should thus be taken as a representation of a portion of a larger 
model in which equilibria exist.  In addition, by depicting that the producer captures 
all of the available surplus, Figure 4 in effect presumes that the producer is engaging 
in perfect price discrimination.  Spatial competition models can be adjusted fairly eas-
ily to take into account the fact that price discrimination is inevitably somewhat imper-
fect. See Yoo, supra note 5, at 261-62 & fig.6. 
184 Tiebout, supra note 17, at 419. 
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Figure 4:  A Graphical Representation of Spatial Competition  
in a Geographic Space 
main street
utility
consumers occupy fixed locations and the providers of the public 
good adjust their locations in response to the distribution of potential 
customers and the location of their competitors.  The resulting model 
is also quite similar to the classic conception of club goods.  The key 
difference is that the decrease in utility, which determines purchasing 
patterns, results from transportation costs rather than from conges-
tion costs. 
Spatial competition that depicts differentiated products vying for 
consumers by varying their attributes along a spectrum of product 
characteristics would seem a natural way to model competition among 
copyrighted works.  Spatial competition also captures the effect of en-
try by imperfect substitutes that characterizes the market for copy-
righted works.  Furthermore, it allows for equilibria to be determined 
by variations in product characteristics and by different consumers’ 
taste for those characteristics rather than by price or quantity. 
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2.  The Policy Implications of Spatial Competition for Copyright 
a. The Feasibility of Promoting Optimal Access 
Most importantly for our purposes, spatial competition offers new 
solutions to problems that appear to be intractable under the pure 
public goods theory.185  Consider first the problem of inefficient ac-
cess associated with supramarginal cost pricing.  As a preliminary mat-
ter, spatial competition calls into question whether the spread be-
tween price and marginal cost represents an appropriate measure of 
access efficiency.  When products have different characteristics, con-
sumer surplus—the difference between a consumer’s reservation price 
and the actual price paid—is only one source of economic welfare.  
Consumers can also derive welfare from consuming goods that fit bet-
ter with their preferences.  Thus, the fact that markets for copyrighted 
works reach equilibrium at a point where price exceeds marginal cost 
is not necessarily an indication of market failure; rather, it may be 
nothing more than a side effect of the fact that products are differen-
tiated.  Indeed, when both sources of economic welfare are taken into 
account, an equilibrium in which price exceeds marginal cost may in 
fact be optimal.186
At the same time, spatial competition reveals the important role 
that entry can play in promoting access.  As noted earlier, the pres-
ence of supracompetitive returns attracts entry by other producers of 
close substitutes until those supracompetitive returns have been dissi-
pated.187  Whether entry causes price to rise or fall depends on its ef-
fect on the elasticity of demand.  Because entry by close substitutes 
185 The discussion that follows extends my previous analysis of these issues in Yoo, 
supra note 5, at 252-56, 264-76. 
186 For the classic statement, see CHAMBERLIN, supra note 173, at 94 (conceding 
that the equilibrium under monopolistic competition could be regarded as “a sort of 
ideal”).  For more contemporary statements of the same principle, see BEATH &
KATSOULACOS, supra note 169, at 61-63; KELVIN LANCASTER, VARIETY, EQUITY, AND EF-
FICIENCY 14 (1979).  For similar conclusions offered in the related context of monopo-
listic competition, see Robert L. Bishop, Monopolistic Competition and Welfare Economics,
in MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION THEORY: STUDIES IN IMPACT 251, 261 (Robert E. 
Kuenne ed., 1967); E.H. Chamberlin, Product Heterogeneity and Public Policy, 40 AM.
ECON. REV. 85, 89-92 (1950); Harold Demsetz, The Nature of Equilibrium in Monopolistic 
Competition, 67 J. POL. ECON. 21, 22 (1959); Avinash K. Dixit & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Mo-
nopolistic Competition and Optimum Product Diversity, 67 AM. ECON. REV. 297, 300-02 
(1977); N. Gregory Mankiw & Michael D. Whinston, Free Entry and Social Inefficiency, 17 
RAND J. ECON. 48, 49, 54-55 (1986); Michael Spence, Product Differentiation and Welfare,
66 AM. ECON. REV. 407, 407-08, 411 (1976). 
187 See supra note 170 and accompanying text. 
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should cause demand to become more elastic, entry should have the 
effect of pushing price toward marginal cost in much the same man-
ner as entry does under perfect competition.188  Under any pricing re-
gime, the spread between price and marginal cost should be relatively 
small if the economy is sufficiently large.  Indeed, if the economy is 
made infinitely large, either by letting the utility that customers derive 
approach infinity or by letting the fixed costs of entry approach zero, 
prices will asymptotically converge to marginal cost.189
This observation implies that increasing the size of the market by 
increasing the number of welfare-generating activities encompassed 
by copyright represents an alternative approach to promoting access.  
Producers will divide the available surplus until the surplus captured 
by each individual producer no longer exceeds the fixed costs of en-
try.190  Increasing the surplus available should thus stimulate a higher 
level of competitive entry.  The increased level of entry should drive 
price closer to marginal cost. 
Price discrimination can help bring the equilibrium level of access 
under spatial competition even closer to the optimum in two distinct 
ways.  First, as Stiglitz notes, price discrimination can increase total 
188 Yoo, supra note 5, at 253.  Such price competition would be particularly intense 
if spatial competition were to occur along more than one dimension.  In one-
dimensional spatial competition, every producer competes with no more than two 
competitors.  If the competitive space is expanded to three dimensions, each producer 
may compete with as many as six adjacent neighbors.  If competition expands to four 
dimensions, each producer may theoretically compete with as many as half the firms 
operating in the product group.  G.C. Archibald & G. Rosenbluth, The “New” Theory of 
Consumer Demand and Monopolistic Competition, 89 Q.J. ECON. 569, 576-84 (1975).  Em-
pirical studies have largely confirmed this effect.  See, e.g., Robert C. Feenstra & James 
A. Levinsohn, Estimating Markups and Market Conduct with Multidimensional Product At-
tributes, 62 REV. ECON. STUD. 19, 36-41 (1995) (concluding that automobiles compete 
with each other spatially along at least four different product characteristics and that 
the average car competed with 5.90 other models). 
189 BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 169, at 145-47; Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 
22, at 761; Eaton & Wooders, supra note 21, at 289-91, 292, 294.  For similar results de-
rived in the related context of monopolistic competition, see Jean-Pascal Benassy, Mar-
ket Size and Substitutability in Imperfect Competition:  A Bertrand-Edgeworth-Chamberlin Model,
56 REV. ECON. STUD. 217, 231-32 (1989); Oliver D. Hart, Monopolistic Competition in a 
Large Economy with Differentiated Commodities, 46 REV. ECON. STUD. 1, 11-13, 20 (1979); 
Larry E. Jones, The Efficiency of Monopolistically Competitive Equilibria in Large Economies:  
Commodity Differentiation with Gross Substitutes, 41 J. ECON. THEORY 356, 358, 372, 375 
(1987); Mankiw & Whinston, supra note 186, at 56-57. 
190 Again, the “integer problem” created by fixed cost indivisibilities and the local-
ized nature of spatial competition can allow producers to earn supracompetitive re-
turns.  So long as the economy is sufficiently large, any such profits should be relatively 
small. See supra notes 153, 170. 
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output by allowing producers to sell to low-value users without having 
to sacrifice any revenue from sales to high-value users.191  Second, 
price discrimination has the added benefit of promoting entry by in-
creasing producers’ ability to appropriate surplus.  The resulting in-
crease in price competition should provide an independent force driv-
ing prices closer to marginal cost. 
Modeling copyright as an impure public good thus suggests an al-
ternative approach to promoting access that differs starkly from the 
conventional approach.  Rather than promoting access directly by lim-
iting the level of copyright protection, the impure public goods ap-
proach promotes access indirectly by facilitating entry and allowing 
the ensuing increase in competition to drive price closer to marginal 
cost.  In the process, it contradicts the conventional approach’s pre-
sumption that any solution that allows authors to recover their first-
copy costs is bounded away from providing optimal levels of access to 
copyrighted works.  Indeed, because price converges asymptotically to 
marginal cost as entry increases, the systematic bias toward underutili-
zation simply disappears.  In addition, the fact that entry will continue 
until all supracompetitive returns are dissipated undercuts any sugges-
tion that increasing the total surplus encompassed by copyright will 
enhance authors’ ability to earn supracompetitive returns. 
A spatial competition approach also avoids the tendency in the ex-
isting literature to represent all of the different aspects of copyright 
protection with a single variable and to speak in general terms about 
the overall strength of copyright protection.192  Instead, it suggests that 
access would best be promoted if copyright protection were relatively 
strong along certain dimensions and relatively weak along others.  
Specifically, the fact that maximizing entry can simultaneously in-
crease incentives to create copyrightable works and promote efficient 
access to those works favors making the copyright relatively “large,” in 
that it contains a large number of surplus-generating activities within 
its scope.  Entry would further be promoted if copyright were rela-
191 Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 310-11; see also Severin Borenstein, Price Discrimination 
in Free-Entry Markets, 16 RAND J. ECON. 380, 392, 394-95 (1985) (concluding that price 
discrimination under spatial competition can increase total quantity sold). 
192 See Christian Koboldt, Intellectual Property and Optimal Copyright Protection, 19 J.
CULTURAL ECON. 131, 136 (1995) (representing all aspects of copyright protection 
with a single variable, P); Landes & Posner, supra note 1, at 333-36 (representing all 
aspects of copyright protection with a single variable, z); Ian E. Novos & Michael 
Waldman, The Effects of Increased Copyright Protection:  An Analytic Approach, 92 J. POL.
ECON. 236, 238-39 (1984) (representing all aspects of copyright protection with a sin-
gle variable, H). 
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tively “intense,” in that it permits authors to appropriate a significant 
proportion of the available surplus.  At the same time, the desire to 
promote such entry counsels both against imposing any artificial re-
strictions on the level of entry by close substitutes and in favor of a 
copyright that is relatively “narrow,” in that a competing product may 
come relatively close in the characteristics space to existing works 
without constituting infringement.193
b. The Feasibility of Optimal Incentives 
As noted earlier, spatial competition also opens up the possibility 
that markets might provide optimal levels of access.194  Early work sug-
gested that in the absence of perfect price discrimination, markets for 
differentiated products would exhibit a systematic bias toward produc-
ing too few goods.195  Samuelson and Stiglitz both recognized that, 
193 Yoo, supra note 5, at 265-72.  For related arguments in the context of patents, 
see Richard Gilbert & Carl Shapiro, Optimal Patent Length and Breadth, 21 RAND J.
ECON. 106, 106-07 (1990); Paul Klemperer, How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protec-
tion Be?, 21 RAND J. ECON. 113, 120-24 (1990). 
194 See supra note 21 and accompanying text.  The discussion that follows extends 
the analysis first discussed in Yoo, supra note 5, in 256-64. 
195 Michael Spence, Product Selection, Fixed Costs, and Monopolistic Competition, 43 
REV. ECON. STUD. 217, 217-20 (1976) (concluding that the complete appropriation of 
consumer surplus is a necessary condition for optimal provision).  For a related argu-
ment, see R. Polk Wagner, Information Wants To Be Free:  Intellectual Property and the My-
thologies of Control, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 995, 1017-24 (2003) (arguing that increasing 
the appropriability of information goods likely leads to an overall increase in the pro-
duction of distinct works). 
 The reasons are well illustrated by the following example. Consider the extreme 
case when marginal cost is zero.  Economic welfare would increase if a work were cre-
ated whenever the prospective benefits of that work exceed the fixed costs needed to 
produce it.  For example, society would benefit from a work that created $10 million in 
surplus and required $7.5 million in fixed costs to make.  If the author were only able 
to appropriate 70% of the available surplus, however, she would receive only $7 mil-
lion in revenue.  The inability to capture all of the surplus created would lead the au-
thor not to create the work even though economic welfare would have increased had 
she done so.  Enabling the author to appropriate 80% of the available surplus would 
allow works that cost $7.5 million to be created, but would still leave out works that cost 
$9 million despite the fact that creating that work would also enhance economic wel-
fare.  The only way to ensure the creation of the marginal welfare-enhancing work (the 
work whose cost is just below the total benefits of $10 million) is to enable perfect 
price discrimination.  Yoo, supra note 5, at 257. 
 In addition, price discrimination may well be a necessary condition for the exis-
tence of equilibria.  Phillip J. Lederer & Arthur P. Hurter, Jr., Competition of Firms:  Dis-
criminatory Pricing and Location, 54 ECONOMETRICA 623, 623-24 (1986); W.B. MacLeod 
et al., Price Discrimination and Equilibrium in Monopolistic Competition, 6 INT’L J. INDUS.
ORG. 429, 429 (1988). 
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even in the absence of price discrimination, spatial competition can 
produce the optimal number of goods.196
Again, the key to understanding why this is the case is the 
Samuelson condition.  As noted earlier, the optimal provision of an 
impure public good requires the producer to appropriate the sum of 
marginal benefits derived by all of the consumers of that good.  The 
problem is that markets do not provide an incentive-compatible 
mechanism for determining consumers’ marginal benefits.  On the 
contrary, consumers have the incentive to understate the intensity of 
their preferences in an attempt to easy ride on contributions made by 
others.  It is for this reason that markets tend to produce too few pub-
lic goods. 
This tendency toward underproduction is mitigated in the case of 
spatial competition by the fact that the surplus captured by those who 
enter comes from two different sources.  Part of the surplus captured 
by the new entrant results from demand creation—that is, new surplus 
generated either by inducing consumers who were otherwise not pur-
chasing to enter the market or by providing greater utility to those 
who were already purchasing by allowing them to obtain goods that lie 
closer to their ideal preferences.  Because demand creation represents 
an incremental increase in welfare, it tends to push the market equi-
librium toward the welfare-maximizing result. 
At the same time, some of the surplus captured by the new entrant 
is the result of demand diversion—that is, surplus cannibalized from 
other producers already in the market.  Because this surplus was al-
ready being satisfied by a prior entrant, its appropriation by the new 
entrant represents a wealth transfer from one producer to another 
that makes no incremental contribution to economic welfare. 
196 See Samuelson, Aspects, supra note 7, at 335 (reasoning that in mixed cases be-
tween the polar extremes of private and pure public goods, “we might find just the 
right conditions of scarcity of space and of independence of consumptions so that or-
dinary market pricing could lead to the optimum,” provided that such ordinary pricing 
“happens to pick up each indirect external marginal utility”); Stiglitz, supra note 21, at 
312 (noting that spatial competition in the absence of price discrimination can reach 
equilibria that are social-welfare maximizing).  For analogous findings in the context 
of monopolistic competition, see BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 169, at 61-66; 
G.C. Archibald, Chamberlin Versus Chicago, 29 REV. ECON. STUD. 2, 7-14 (1961); Oliver 
D. Hart, Monopolistic Competition in the Spirit of Chamberlin:  Special Results, 95 ECON. J.
889, 901, 903 (1985); Roger W. Koenker & Martin K. Perry, Product Differentiation, Mo-
nopolistic Competition, and Public Policy, 12 BELL J. ECON. 217, 226-27 (1981); MacLeod, 
supra note 195, at 430; Mankiw & Whinston, supra note 186, at 55; Spence, supra note 
186, at 413. 
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The problem is that profit-maximizing entrants base their entry 
decisions on a comparison of total revenue with total costs without re-
gard to whether the revenue captured results from demand creation 
or demand diversion.  Because the presence of demand diversion 
causes total revenue to exceed total social benefits, entrants may find 
it profitable to enter even when it would be socially wasteful for them 
to do so.  As such, demand diversion can promote the production of 
additional goods even when further entry would be economically inef-
ficient.197  Concern about excess entry may strike some people as 
somewhat unorthodox, given that greater product choice and greater 
price competition are generally regarded as economically benefi-
cial.198  It remains an important issue when products are differentiated 
and entry requires the incurrence of fixed costs, since entry would be 
inefficient if the economic benefits associated with an additional 
product do not exceed the fixed costs of entry.199
197 Borenstein, supra note 191, at 388-89, 393; see also Mankiw & Whinston, supra
note 186, at 54-55 (offering a similar discussion in the context of monopolistic compe-
tition); Spence, supra note 195, at 410 (same).  The following example may help illus-
trate the point.  Suppose that a new entrant exactly duplicates the position of an exist-
ing product.  Because all of the revenue captured by the entrant would consist 
exclusively of demand diversion, entry would simply waste resources without providing 
any compensating welfare benefits.  Steven T. Berry & Joel Waldfogel, Free Entry and 
Social Inefficiency in Radio Broadcasting, 30 RAND J. ECON. 397, 397-98 (1999). 
 A recent paper by Bhaskar and To identifies a different source of demand diver-
sion.  Rather than following the standard assumption in the literature that all firms 
enter simultaneously, they presume that entry occurs after existing firms have already 
evenly distributed themselves across the product space.  Under this approach, demand 
diversion arises not as a result of direct business stealing, but rather from the fact that 
existing firms must relocate in order to accommodate the new entrant.  This in turn 
allows the new entrant to appropriate surplus that was previously captured by one of 
the incumbents before it was forced to move to a different location.  Bhaskar & To, 
supra note 174, at 775.  Despite the differences in formulation between these two ap-
proaches, the policy implications are largely the same for both.  To the extent that 
revenue consists of demand diversion, it drives markets toward excess entry. 
198 See, e.g., J. MacKie-Mason et al., Service Architecture and Content Provision, 20 
TELECOMM. POL’Y 203, 207 (1996) (describing excess entry as “fairly unconventional 
for an economic problem,” given that “more choice over available goods is routinely 
assumed to be unambiguously desirable”).
199 See Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 22, at 731 (calling “whether there are too few or 
too many products in equilibrium” the “major issue” in the case of the monopolistic 
competition branch of product differentiation); Mankiw & Whinston, supra note 186, 
at 48 (noting that “[e]conomists typically presume that free entry is desirable for social 
efficiency,” but that entry can be inefficient when it requires the incurrence of fixed 
costs); Spence, supra note 186, at 408 (noting that too much and too little entry repre-
sent important, but oft-ignored sources of welfare loss when products are differenti-
ated).
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The systematic bias toward producing too many goods inherent in 
demand diversion can compensate for the systematic bias toward pro-
ducing too few works inherent in the Samuelson condition as well as 
imperfections in the ability to appropriate surplus.  Whether markets 
will reach equilibrium with too many or too few goods depends on 
which of these two effects dominates.  Indeed, if the tendency toward 
overproduction caused by demand diversion happens to offset exactly 
the tendency toward underproduction associated with easy riding and 
nonappropriability, markets would produce the optimal number of 
goods.  Spatial models thus do not necessarily exhibit the systematic 
tendency toward underproduction characteristic of pure public goods 
models.
That said, there is no reason to suppose that these forces will 
counterbalance each other so precisely.  Whether conditions are such 
that markets will reach equilibrium with too many or too few impure 
public goods has important policy implications.  Consider first the 
case in which demand diversion comprises a relatively small amount 
of the surplus appropriated by the entrant, either because producers 
are able to appropriate only a relatively small proportion of the avail-
able surplus created by their goods or because the good at issue has 
relatively few close substitutes.  When this is the case, one would ex-
pect the market to reach equilibrium at a point where there are too 
few works, thus leaving no reason for policymakers not to make copy-
right protection as large, intense, and narrow as possible.  Doing so 
would maximize incentives for creation and thereby bring the level of 
product variety as close to optimal as possible.  At the same time, the 
increase in entry would promote efficient levels of access to the works 
by maximizing the level of competition among close substitutes. 
For these types of works, then, the tension between access and in-
centives generally thought to underlie much of copyright policy dis-
appears.  Instead, the same policy instruments can promote both in-
terests simultaneously.  As a result, the justification for regarding 
copyright as a “necessary evil” collapses.200
200 For the classic statement of this position, see Thomas B. Macaulay, Speech Be-
fore the House of Commons (Feb. 5, 1841), in 8 THE WORKS OF LORD MACAULAY 195, 
199 (Lady Trevelyan ed., 1900) (“It is good that authors should be remunerated; and 
the least exceptionable way of remunerating them is by a monopoly.  Yet monopoly is 
an evil.  For the sake of the good we must submit to the evil; but the evil ought not to 
last a day longer than is necessary for the purpose of securing the good.”).  For exam-
ples of modern restatements of this position, see, for example, Brennan, supra note 3, 
at 687-88; Mark A. Lemley, Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 
U. CHI. L. REV. 129, 131 (2004); Mark S. Nadel, How Current Copyright Law Discourages 
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The policy implications are somewhat more complicated when 
works serve as reasonably good substitutes for one another and when 
producers are able to appropriate a large proportion of the available 
surplus.  Under these circumstances, it is likely that demand diversion 
will overcompensate for the tendency toward underproduction caused 
by easy riding and that markets will produce too many works in equi-
librium.  When that is the case, providing proper incentives for creat-
ing the optimal number of works necessarily requires limiting either 
the size or the intensity of copyright protection.  The concomitant re-
duction in the degree of entry necessarily causes some reduction in 
the level of access.  Although the access/incentive tradeoff reappears 
for these goods, it bears emphasizing that it is no longer an endemic 
problem confronting all of copyright.  Instead, it is a more limited 
problem that is significantly more restricted in scope and contingent 
upon the existence of certain factual predicates. 
Because the magnitude of the tradeoff depends on the level of 
demand diversion associated with the level of substitutability and ap-
propriability inherent in a particular work, a first-best solution would 
require calibrating the level of copyright protection on a case-by-case 
basis.  Making such evaluations should prove no easy matter.  If spatial 
competition occurs in a geographic space, it may be possible to ob-
serve and parameterize the relevant transportation cost functions.  If 
spatial competition occurs in a characteristics space, the problem is 
considerably more difficult.  Unlike price and cost, individual prefer-
ences for particular product characteristics cannot be observed di-
rectly.  Moreover, preference functions can take a much broader 
range of shapes and magnitudes than transportation cost functions, 
which are constrained by the cost characteristics of the inputs needed 
to provide the necessary transportation.  For this reason, two leading 
spatial competition theorists candidly acknowledge that with respect 
to spatial competition in a characteristics space, “we believe that we 
would be quite unable to recognize an optimum if we saw one.”201
Despite these difficulties, a small literature has emerged attempt-
ing to assess the potential welfare losses from excess entry in the con-
Creative Output:  The Overlooked Impact of Marketing, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 785, 787 
(2004); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Asserting Copyright’s Democratic Principles in the Global 
Arena, 51 VAND. L. REV. 217, 248-49 (1998); Yen, supra note 23, at 1368.  See generally
Yoo, supra note 5, at 216 n.9 (collecting other similar sources). 
201 Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 22, at 760; see also Berry & Waldfogel, supra note 
197, at 417 (suggesting that empirically modeling entry in a characteristics space would 
require techniques that exceed the current state of the art). 
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text of spatial competition among differentiated products.202  Some 
studies suggest that so long as the relevant economy is relatively large, 
any welfare losses resulting from excessive entry are likely to be quite 
small.203  Other studies have found the welfare losses from excess entry 
to be more significant.204
It thus appears that the empirical record is not yet sufficiently de-
veloped to infer how often entry will be optimal, excessive, or insuffi-
cient.  As a result, decision makers seeking to adjust the scope of copy-
right protection to achieve optimal entry will struggle to determine 
the appropriate direction and magnitude of such adjustments.  In ad-
dition, any welfare losses resulting from excess entry would necessarily 
be counterbalanced by welfare gains from increased product variety 
and increased price competition. 
Decisions about the scope of copyright protection would thus de-
pend on a careful assessment of a number of case-specific considera-
tions, including the availability of substitutes for the work in question, 
consumers’ preferences for the work, and the author’s ability to ap-
202 See Yoo, supra note 5, at 274-76 (offering a preliminary review of the literature). 
203 For example, Ronald Goettler and Ron Shachar study spatial competition 
among major broadcast television networks, concluding that the equilibrium nearly 
achieved the optimal level of product differentiation, with the shortfall explained by 
bounded rationality and the networks’ adherence to certain rules of thumb about 
scheduling.  Ronald L. Goettler & Ron Shachar, Spatial Competition in the Network Televi-
sion Industry, 32 RAND J. ECON. 624, 647-52 (2001).  For other estimates suggesting 
that the welfare losses from excess entry are relatively small, see Eaton & Wooders, su-
pra note 21, at 291 (calling the resource misallocation from excess entry “vanishingly 
small” in large economies); G.K. Yarrow, Welfare Losses in Oligopoly and Monopolistic Com-
petition, 33 J. INDUS. ECON. 515, 520 (1985) (estimating welfare losses for large econo-
mies at 0.5% of total revenue); cf. Spence, supra note 195, at 411-13 (conducting a se-
ries of illustrative calculations in the related context of monopolistic competition and 
concluding that “the equilibrium is often a reasonably good approximation to the con-
strained optimum”).  A very different result obtains in the case of small economies.  See
Yarrow, supra, at 521-23 (concluding that welfare losses are much greater in such situa-
tions); BEATH & KATSOULACOS, supra note 169, at 64-66 (reaching a similar conclu-
sion).
204 Steven Berry and Joel Waldfogel study spatial competition for advertising 
among radio stations, finding excess entry of 74% with an annual deadweight loss of 
$2.3 billion.  They acknowledge that these welfare losses might be offset by welfare 
benefits to radio listeners (rather than advertisers) and by welfare gains from increases 
in the diversity in radio programming, neither of which they were able to measure di-
rectly.  Berry & Waldfogel, supra note 197, at 411-17. 
 Gerald Faulhaber employs a spatial competition model to study whether file shar-
ing and DRM have caused excess entry in the music industry, concluding that excess 
entry likely has occurred.  At the same time, Faulhaber recognizes that entry might 
create additional benefits not taken into account by his model if such entry inspires 
the creation of follow-on works.  Faulhaber, supra note 169, at 92-102. 
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propriate surplus.  The transaction costs of making these determina-
tions would inevitably be significant.  In addition, the workability of a 
case-by-case approach varies greatly based on whether the scope of 
copyright protection is determined on an ex ante or an ex post basis.  
Consider first the problems of making such an assessment ex ante.  
Determining the level of appropriability and substitutability is likely to 
be particularly difficult before the work is actually created.  In addi-
tion, copyright law would have to devise some method to address the 
moral hazard problems caused by the possibility that authors might 
shirk in the quality of their works once the level of copyright protec-
tion has been set.  The legal system would also have to find a way to 
credibly commit to the level of protection established ex ante in order 
to protect authors against the dangers of ex post opportunism once 
the first-copy costs have been sunk.  Problems would also surround 
any attempt to assess the level of appropriability and substitutability 
associated with a particular work ex post.  The ex ante uncertainty 
would force authors to discount their expectations about the likely 
value of their works against the possibility of a change in valuation ex 
post.
The analysis is further complicated by the fact that appropriability 
and substitutability tend to change over time.  Thus, even if policy-
makers managed to identify those situations in which access and in-
centives are in tension and managed to calibrate copyright so as to 
strike the proper balance between those considerations, the resulting 
balance between access and incentives is unlikely to prove stable. 
These concerns suggest that the better alternative may be to 
forego case-by-case analysis in favor of a simpler approach that, de-
spite being a bit Procrustean, establishes general rules that apply to all 
copyrightable works.  Two possible approaches immediately come to 
mind.  On the one hand, Congress and the courts could ignore the 
potential welfare losses from excess entry and instead maximize access 
by making copyright as large, intense, and narrow as possible.  On the 
other hand, Congress and the courts could ignore the case-by-case 
variations and attempt to calibrate a uniform copyright to strike a 
rough balance between the welfare losses from excess entry and the 
welfare losses from insufficient access.  Although a uniform approach 
would overprotect some works and underprotect others, the overall 
result may be preferable both to evaluating copyright on a case-by-case 
basis and to simply maximizing entry. 
Between these two alternatives, I would favor fostering a copyright 
that is large, intense, and narrow over trying to strike a balance.  Any 
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attempt to calibrate the level of copyright protection would confront 
the same dearth of empirical evidence regarding the pervasiveness 
and the magnitude of the welfare losses associated with excess entry 
discussed above.  This in turn would force Congress and the courts to 
base their resolution of the underlying tradeoff largely on conjecture.  
In contrast, making copyright as large, intense, and narrow as possible 
would have the institutional advantage of allowing decentralized deci-
sions by market actors all over the economy to determine the proper 
level of entry.  Not only should this improve the mechanism for in-
corporating information about costs and consumer preferences at any 
particular point, it should also accommodate technological change 
without incurring the delay biases inherent in governmental proc-
esses.205  This also would have the advantage of giving legislators and 
courts a mandate that is relatively clear and easy to implement when 
compared with the type of empirically speculative and indeterminate 
balancing implicit in the other approach.  The maximization of entry 
and access, even when entry may be economically excessive, should 
also have some appeal to those who favor maximizing access to and 
diversity of creative works for noneconomic reasons.206
205 For a sampling of the literature claiming that political biases are distorting the 
copyright system, see, for example, LANDES & POSNER, supra note 34, at 403-19; Tom 
W. Bell, Escape from Copyright:  Market Success vs. Statutory Failure in the Protection of Expres-
sive Works, 69 U. CIN. L. REV. 741, 786-87 (2001); Mark A. Lemley, The Constitutionaliza-
tion of Technology Law, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 529, 531-33 (2000); Jessica Litman, Copy-
right Legislation and Technological Change, 68 OR. L. REV. 275, 359 (1989); Joseph P. Liu, 
Copyright and Time:  A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 448-51 (2002); Merges, supra
note 32, at 1868-74; Sterk, supra note 32, at 1244-46; Timothy Wu, Copyright’s Communi-
cations Policy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 278, 344 (2004).  For examples of commentators argu-
ing that the biases in the political process justify more intrusive judicial review, see 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 215-18 (2004); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Locating 
Copyright Within the First Amendment Skein, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1, 69 (2001).  Others have 
cogently observed that copyright is not the only area of the law supposedly affected by 
public choice failures and that if accepted, this argument would justify intrusive judi-
cial review of all economic legislation in a manner similar to the now-discredited ap-
proach associated with the Lochner era.  Thomas B. Nachbar, Judicial Review and the 
Quest To Keep Copyright Pure, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 33, 53-54 (2003); Paul 
M. Schwartz & William Michael Treanor, Eldred and Lochner:  Copyright Term Extension 
and Intellectual Property as Constitutional Property, 112 YALE L.J. 2331, 2400-09 (2003).  It 
thus comes as no surprise that the Supreme Court has firmly rejected calls for more 
exacting judicial scrutiny of copyright laws.  Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 204-05 & 
n.10, 208, 217-21 (2003). 
206  Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common Use:  First Amendment Constraints on En-
closure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354, 377-81 (1999); Neil Weinstock 
Netanel, Copyright and “Market Power” in the Marketplace of Ideas, in ANTITRUST, PATENTS 
AND COPYRIGHT 149, 161 (François Lévêque & Howard Shelanski eds., 2005). 
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3.  Potential Limitations to Spatial Competition 
The policy implications of analyzing copyright through the lens of 
spatial competition are quite striking.  The systematic biases toward 
underproduction and underutilization and the danger of supracom-
petitive returns largely disappear.  Instead, spatial competition shows 
how entry can promote the ability of low-value consumers to access 
works as well as prevent authors from earning supracompetitive re-
turns.  At the same time, spatial competition provides a basis for de-
termining when entry is excessive.  Thus, rather than providing consis-
tent support for the expansion of copyright protection, spatial 
competition introduces notions of optimality that can serve as a basis 
for distinguishing the dimensions along which copyright protection is 
too strong and too weak.  Other portions of the literature on spatial 
competition add additional nuances, such as how sunk costs of entry207
and multilocation entry by a single firm,208 can foreclose entry by later 
players.
At the same time, the fit between copyright and spatial competi-
tion is not necessarily perfect.  For example, spatial models work only 
if consumers can organize the available products into a set of ordinal 
rankings.  Preferences for certain creative works (such as music, which 
spans formats including classical, jazz, Top 40, oldies, rock, country, 
contemporary Christian, and easy listening) may prove insusceptible 
to being arranged into a coherent linear spectrum.  Indeed, as Ar-
row’s theorem points out,209 consumer preferences can actually be 
structured in such a way that makes it impossible to talk meaningfully 
about an overarching hierarchy of preferences. 
207 William J. Baumol, Calculation of Optimal Product and Retailer Characteristics:  The 
Abstract Product Approach, 75 J. POL. ECON. 674, 679 n.4 (1967); Giacomo Bonanno, Lo-
cation Choice, Product Proliferation and Entry Deterrence, 54 REV. ECON. STUD. 37 (1987); B. 
Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, Exit Barriers Are Entry Barriers:  The Durability of Capital 
as a Barrier to Entry, 11 BELL J. ECON. 721 (1980); D.A. Hay, Sequential Entry and Entry-
Deterring Strategies in Spatial Competition, 28 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 240 (1976); W.J. 
Lane, Product Differentiation in a Market with Endogenous Sequential Entry, 11 BELL J.
ECON. 237, 239 (1980); Damien J. Neven, Endogenous Sequential Entry in a Spatial Model,
5 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 419 (1987); Edward C. Prescott & Michael Visscher, Sequential 
Location Among Firms with Foresight, 8 BELL J. ECON. 378 (1977). 
208 James A. Brander & Jonathan Eaton, Product Line Rivalry, 74 AM. ECON. REV.
323, 330-32 (1984); B. Curtis Eaton & Richard G. Lipsey, The Theory of Market Pre-
emption:  The Persistence of Excess Capacity and Monopoly in Growing Spatial Markets, 46 
ECONOMICA (n.s.) 149 (1979); Kenneth L. Judd, Credible Spatial Preemption, 16 RAND J.
ECON. 153 (1985); Schmalensee, supra note 171. 
209 KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES 2-3 (2d ed. 1966). 
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Moreover, much of the attractiveness of the spatial competition 
equilibrium follows from the assumption that consumers are uni-
formly distributed across the product space.  Relaxing this assumption 
can weaken competition in some portions of the product spectrum 
and can allow firms in those areas to earn sustainable supracompeti-
tive returns.210  The model also assumes that entry is open to anyone 
willing to incur the fixed costs needed to enter.  In so doing, it must 
recognize that the current definition of copyright infringement places 
some legal limits on how closely one work can resemble another.211  In 
assuming that entry is free, the spatial competition model also down-
plays the possibility that some authors may have unique abilities to 
generate high levels of utility at particular locations on the product 
spectrum, which would limit the degree of competition faced by those 
authors’ works. 
Moreover, spatial competition is a discrete choice model, in that it 
assumes consumers purchase a single product from the one producer 
positioned closest to their respective locations.  Thus, the model ig-
nores the possibility that consumers may wish to purchase goods from 
multiple providers in multiple locations.  In addition, it ignores the 
possibility that consumers may not want to buy their entire amount of 
a particular product from the closest provider—they may instead want 
to “crossover” and purchase small quantities from relatively distant 
providers.212  Because they look at each purchaser’s decision in isola-
tion, discrete choice models can also have difficulty capturing de-
mand interdependencies, such as those associated with solidarity 
goods and network economic effects, that exist when one individual’s 
purchasing decisions depend on the purchasing decisions of others. 
None of these obstacles are necessarily insuperable.  For example, 
even if the particular product characteristics defy categorization into a 
coherent spectrum, it might well be possible to organize products 
based on their appeal to different demographic groups (e.g., organiz-
ing types of music into a coherent spectrum based on the average age 
210 The seminal analysis of the impact of preference asymmetries was offered by 
Kaldor.  Nicholas Kaldor, Market Imperfection and Excess Capacity, 2 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 
33, 37-40 (1935).  For more recent embellishments on this insight, see B. Curtis Eaton 
& Richard G. Lipsey, The Non-Uniqueness of Equilibrium in the Löschian Location Model, 66 
AM. ECON. REV. 77 (1976); Michael Waterson, The Economics of Product Patents, 80 AM.
ECON. REV. 860 (1990). 
211 Lemley, supra note 3, at 1057. 
212 See Eaton & Lipsey, supra note 22, at 751 (citing LANCASTER, supra note 186) 
(noting Kelvin Lancaster’s use of the term “crossover” to describe when a consumer 
purchases goods outside of the local market). 
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of their respective audiences).  In addition, sophisticated econometric 
techniques exist that can abstract unobservable product characteristics 
from the underlying data.213  Furthermore, practical limitations on en-
try can be modeled by hypothesizing that follow-on entry into certain 
locations is impossible or by assuming that certain works will achieve a 
higher level of utility than others. Lastly, the possibility that consum-
ers might want to consume multiple products might be best accom-
modated by shifting to a model of differentiated products known as 
monopolistic competition.  This model is less wedded to the discrete 
choice framework and more easily accommodates concerns such as 
the inability to organize products into a spectrum of ordinal rankings, 
entry asymmetries, multiple purchases and crossover, and demand in-
terdependencies.214
More importantly, the insights of an impure public goods ap-
proach should remain clear even if the precise arguments and pa-
rameters for any particular approach to modeling impure public 
goods cannot be resolved.  Markets for copyrighted works are subject 
to numerous variations in quality that each can serve as an equilibrat-
ing force despite the fact that indivisibility forces each customer to 
consume the same quantity.  Thus, the overall promise of shifting to 
an impure public goods approach should remain apparent even if 
spatial competition ultimately proves to be an unsatisfactory way to 
model markets for copyrighted works. 
IV. THE POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF APPLYING IMPURE 
PUBLIC GOODS THEORY TO COPYRIGHT
Recognizing that copyright should be regarded as an impure (as 
opposed to a pure) public good carries with it a number of important 
policy implications.  In this Part, I apply the insights gained from the 
foregoing analysis to evaluate the series of copyright-related doctrines 
introduced in Part I.C.  The absence of any systematic tendency to-
ward underproduction or underutilization suggests that many of the 
213 See Goettler & Shachar, supra note 203, at 641-43 (inferring that television pro-
gramming competes in a four-dimensional characteristics space). 
214 See Yoo, supra note 5, at 236-41 (describing the monopolistic competition ap-
proach to modeling product differentiation).  Monopolistic competition allows for the 
possibility that consumers may want to consume multiple products by assuming that all 
producers are in equal competition with one another.  Thus, entry by a new producer 
will divert sales from all incumbent producers symmetrically.  The tradeoff, however, is 
that the symmetry assumption fails to capture the possibility that competition among 
differentiated products might be localized.  CHAMBERLIN, supra note 173, at 196-98. 
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current justifications for these doctrines based in pure public goods 
theory need to be reconsidered. 
A.  Fair Use 
As noted earlier, the economics of fair use has traditionally fo-
cused on the impact of transaction costs.  As transaction costs have re-
ceded in importance, commentators have suggested that fair use may 
serve the alternative purpose of striking a balance between access and 
incentives.215
Reformulating the application of public good economics in the 
manner I propose would raise doubts about the viability of these al-
ternative economic justifications for fair use.  Impure public goods 
theory reveals that supramarginal cost pricing might not be as prob-
lematic as these commentators suggest.  The theory that supramar-
ginal cost pricing represents endemic market failure might give way to 
the broader notion that the welfare losses associated with supramar-
ginal cost pricing might be offset by welfare gains from the increased 
product diversity made possible by such pricing.  In other words, what 
appears to be a welfare loss from the standpoint of the price-quantity 
space that dominates conventional microeconomic analysis might in 
fact be a constrained optimum. 
In addition, current justifications for fair use overlook the fact 
that narrowing the scope of fair use and allowing entry to bring prices 
closer to marginal cost might actually promote access by stimulating 
entry and allowing the ensuing increase in competition to reduce 
prices indirectly.  These justifications also fail to consider the possibil-
ity that restricting fair use would promote the most efficient spatially 
competitive equilibrium by enhancing authors’ ability to appropriate 
surplus through price discrimination. 
This underscores the key difference between the role that price 
discrimination plays in the conventional approach to public good 
economics and in the more fundamental approach that I propose in 
this Article.  In the former, the purpose of price discrimination is to 
provide low-value users with access to creative works.  This favors giv-
ing fair use a broad scope and justifies measures that would solve the 
underutilization problem by facilitating low-value users’ ability to ob-
tain access to copyrighted works.  In the latter, the purpose of price 
discrimination is to help authors appropriate more of the available 
215 See supra Part I.C.1. 
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surplus across the entire range of production.  Under this perspective, 
measures that simply facilitate access by low-value users would not rep-
resent a complete solution to the problems posed by public goods. 
A shift to an impure public goods approach would also narrow 
and recast the scope of the access/incentives tradeoff.  Specifically, it 
would no longer be true that any solution would necessarily be second 
best in terms of both access and incentive.  It would also no longer be 
true that promoting one consideration would necessarily come at the 
expense of the other.  Instead, the central policy problem would be 
identifying cases in which substitutability and appropriability render 
excess entry likely.  Implementation of the case-by-case approach im-
plicit in this analysis would pose considerable practical difficulties, as 
demonstrated by the controversy and uncertainty surrounding the 
implementation of the current fair use doctrine.  The lack of clear 
empirical evidence to help determine precisely where the relevant 
lines should be drawn and the relative ease with which policymakers 
and judges could implement a mandate to promote entry suggest that 
copyright policy might be better served if the scope of fair use were 
allowed to contract as transaction costs continue to fall. 
B. Duration 
The theory of impure public goods also calls into question the 
commentary that regards the access/incentives tradeoff implicit in the 
conventional approach as a justification for limiting copyright dura-
tion.216  Specifically, shifting to an impure public goods perspective 
suggests that incentives for creating copyrightable works can be pro-
moted without necessarily sacrificing access, since entry by imperfect 
substitutes should help drive prices toward marginal cost.  Indeed, this 
reasoning suggests that access would be best promoted if copyright 
duration were made as long as constitutionally permitted, since doing 
so would maximize entry and in the process maximize the price com-
petition that minimizes deadweight loss.  The welfare gains from 
product diversity should further offset the welfare losses from su-
pramarginal cost pricing.  Indeed, this suggests that the supposedly 
irreconcilable conflict inherent in the access/incentives tradeoff may 
be overstated. 
Such a solution is subject to an important caveat.  The theory of 
impure public goods suggests that entry may well be excessive if works 
216 See supra Part I.C.2. 
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are highly substitutable and authors are able to appropriate a high 
proportion of the available surplus.  The fact that appropriability and 
substitutability are likely to vary widely suggests that the first-best solu-
tion would require a copyright term that varies from work to work.  
Although suggestions that the copyright term vary on a case-by-case 
basis have appeared from time to time in the literature,217 implemen-
tation difficulties render such a regime impractical. 
This leaves Congress with a choice between second-best alterna-
tives.  It can promote a copyright that is as large, intense, and narrow 
as possible, or it can attempt to calibrate copyright to balance the wel-
fare losses associated with reduced access against those associated with 
excess entry.  As noted earlier, the empirical record is not sufficiently 
well developed to permit a clear assessment of this tradeoff.  The im-
portant insight is that the ultimate balance need not be as inherently 
suboptimal as the conventional approach would lead one to believe. 
C. Compulsory Licenses 
As noted earlier, scholars have invoked the theory of pure public 
goods as support for employing compulsory licenses.  Some view 
compulsory licenses as a way to calibrate the balance between access 
and incentives, while others emphasize the difficulties in inducing 
consumers to reveal the value that they place on public goods.218
Shifting to an impure public goods perspective raises doubts 
about both of these rationales.  With respect to the former justifica-
tion, the foregoing analysis calls into question the extent to which ac-
cess and incentives are truly in tension.  Indeed, when low substitut-
ability and appropriability cause demand diversion to represent a 
relatively small amount of the surplus appropriated by an author, both 
access and incentives can be promoted simultaneously by making 
copyright as large, intense, and narrow as possible.  In these cases, im-
posing a compulsory license would be counterproductive.  Compul-
217 RALPH S. BROWN & ROBERT C. DENICOLA, CASES ON COPYRIGHT, UNFAIR COM-
PETITION, AND RELATED TOPICS BEARING ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKS OF AUTHOR-
SHIP 507 (8th ed. 2002); Robert L. Bard & Lewis Kurlantzick, Copyright Duration at the 
Millennium, 47 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 13, 68 n.126 (2000); cf. WILLIAM D. NORD-
HAUS, INVENTION, GROWTH, AND WELFARE: A THEORETICAL TREATMENT OF TECHNO-
LOGICAL CHANGE 79 (1969) (suggesting a model in which the length of the patent 
term varies with the elasticity of demand); F.M. SCHERER, INNOVATION AND GROWTH:
SCHUMPETERIAN PERSPECTIVES 133 (1984) (calling case-by-case determination of a pat-
ent term “not inconceivable”). 
218 See supra Part I.C.3. 
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sory licenses may be more justifiable when high substitutability and 
appropriability render excess entry more likely.  If compulsory li-
censes were used to reduce excess entry, they would need to be redes-
igned to limit their scope to these cases. 
With respect to the second justification, allowing consumers to al-
locate their purchases spatially among different goods can create de 
facto markets through which consumers can reveal the intensity of 
their preferences despite the incentive incompatibility problems in-
herent in the Samuelson condition.  The impure public goods ap-
proach thus offers an attractive alternative mechanism for determin-
ing consumers’ valuations for public goods.  Determining the 
optimality of the resulting equilibrium would depend on an assess-
ment of the availability of close substitutes and the ability of producers 
to appropriate surplus.  Although such assessments would doubtlessly 
pose significant difficulties, such challenges seem more tractable than 
attempting to measure consumer preferences directly. 
D.  Database Protection 
The economics of impure public goods also offer new insights 
into the proper scope of database protection.219  Reconceiving copy-
right as competition among differentiated products suggests that the 
tradeoff between access and incentives may not represent as central a 
problem as previous analyses suggest.  Furthermore, requiring data-
base owners to instantiate their intangible property into a tangible 
form would do little to solve the incentive incompatibility with respect 
to the revelation of preferences inherent in the Samuelson condition.  
As noted earlier, the fact that the public good may be an input that 
must be combined with other rival inputs does not change its charac-
ter as a public good.220
Equally importantly, the possibility for consumers to allocate their 
purchases spatially opens up new avenues for determining the inten-
sity of their preferences.  In addition, protecting databases against 
copying would foster entry that, in many cases, would simultaneously 
promote both the access and the incentives sides of the tradeoff envi-
sioned by the conventional approach.221
219 See supra Part I.C.4. 
220 See supra note 115 and accompanying text. 
221 Sole-source data may present an exception to the free entry assumption im-
plicit in the impure public goods approach.  The existence of such an exception does 
not justify denying copy protection to data that are freely available. 
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E.  Digital Rights Management 
Shifting to an impure public goods perspective would also shed 
new light on the debate about DRM.222  First and foremost, an impure 
public goods approach recasts the range of quantities over which 
price discrimination is relevant.  Under the conventional approach, 
the primary purpose of price discrimination is to prevent the exclu-
sion of low-value users (represented in Figure 1 by the difference be-
tween Q mon or Q sus and Q eff).  The more fundamental, impure public 
goods approach that I propose suggests that price discrimination is 
relevant over the entire range of output.223  Indeed, it suggests that 
price discrimination can promote efficient levels of provision even if 
total output decreases. 
The impure public goods approach should also effectively elimi-
nate concerns that DRM will enhance authors’ ability to earn supra-
competitive returns.  As noted earlier, competition from close substi-
tutes should effectively dissipate any abnormal profits.224  In the 
process, the impure public goods approach reveals an alternative 
method for promoting access to copyrightable works.  So long as the 
economy is sufficiently large, competition from close substitutes 
should drive prices close to marginal cost. 
The only basis for caution is the possibility that markets for im-
pure public goods might reach equilibrium with excess entry.  Indeed, 
some degree of imperfection in the ability to price discriminate may 
be necessary to compensate for the impetus toward excess entry pro-
vided by demand diversion.  Although the empirical record does not 
permit a definitive resolution of this issue, there seems little reason to 
adopt a default hostility toward DRM.  The institutional considera-
tions discussed above favoring a copyright that is large, intense, and 
narrow would militate in favor of facilitating price discrimination 
through the use of DRM. 
F.  Derivative Uses 
The issues surrounding derivative uses are somewhat more com-
plex.225  The Supreme Court has drawn a distinction between deriva-
tive uses that are “superseding” and those that are “transformative.”  
222 See supra Part I.C.5. 
223 See supra Part II.C.3. 
224 See supra notes 153, 170, 187 and accompanying text. 
225 See supra Part I.C.6. 
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Superseding uses are those that simply displace the original work.  As 
such, they are thought to be more likely to compete directly with the 
original work on which they are based. Transformative uses combine 
the existing work with other creative elements to create a new work.  
Derivative uses that are transformative are often thought to be less 
likely to compete with the original.226  In addition, protecting trans-
formative uses is often regarded as being more consistent with the 
goals of copyright, since such uses necessarily involve additional crea-
tivity.227  Narrowing the derivative use right with respect to transforma-
tive works would arguably foster new creativity while having less of an 
adverse impact on the incentives to create the original work. 
226 In the words of the Court, when discussing the first statutory fair use factor, 
which focuses on “the purpose and character of the use,” 17 U.S.C. § 107(1), 
[t]he central purpose of this investigation is to see, in Justice Story’s words, 
whether the new work merely “supersede[s] the objects” of the original crea-
tion, or instead adds something new, with a further purpose or different char-
acter, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message; it asks, in 
other words, whether and to what extent the new work is “transformative.” 
Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994) (citations omitted) (quot-
ing Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4,901) and Leval, su-
pra note 50, at 1111); see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539, 562 (1985) (inquiring whether a derivative use had the intended purpose of 
“supplanting” the original). 
 Similarly, the third statutory fair use factor, which asks about “the amount and 
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,” 17 
U.S.C. § 107(3), is taken as a proxy for whether the derivative work is likely to serve as a 
replacement for the original.  See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 587-88 (“[A] work composed 
primarily of an original, particularly its heart, with little added or changed, is more 
likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original.”). 
 Finally, in evaluating the fourth statutory fair use factor, which focuses on “the ef-
fect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,” 17 
U.S.C. § 107(4), the Court concluded that 
when a commercial use amounts to a mere duplication of the entirety of an 
original, it clearly “supersede[s] the objects” of the original and serves as a 
market replacement for it.  But when, on the contrary, the second use is trans-
formative, market substitution is at least less certain, and market harm may 
not be so readily inferred. 
Campbell, 510 U.S. at 591 (citations omitted) (quoting Folsom, 9 F. Cas. at 348); see also
Princeton Univ. Press v. Mich. Document Servs., Inc., 99 F.3d 1381, 1386 (6th Cir. 
1996) (en banc) (noting that the presumption of harm to the market for the original 
“disappears entirely where the challenged use is one that transforms the original work 
into a new artistic creation”). 
227 See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579 (“Although such transformative use is not abso-
lutely necessary for a finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and 
the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative works.” (citation and 
footnote omitted)); Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 923 (2d Cir. 
1995) (noting that to the extent a secondary use is not transformative, it adds nothing 
to the advancement of the arts and sciences). 
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In recent years, it has become increasingly clear that the world is 
not as simple as the distinction between superseding and transforma-
tive uses might lead one to believe.  As an initial matter, the fact that a 
transformative use is a work of new authorship does not necessarily 
mean that it does not compete with the original work.228  In addition, 
the courts have increasingly recognized that regardless of whether a 
derivative use directly interferes with the market for the original, mar-
kets for derivative uses can be important in and of themselves.229  For 
example, in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., the Court presciently 
recognized the importance of a distinct market in rap derivatives.230
Two courts of appeals have similarly recognized the emergence of a 
market for licensing photocopies of scholarly journals.231  Although 
courts have struggled with how far they should go in protecting mar-
kets for potential derivative uses,232 they have increasingly recognized 
that including derivative uses within the copyright protection afforded 
to an initial work can have a significant effect on the incentives for 
that work’s creation. 
From the standpoint of the conventional approach, these devel-
opments have once again sharpened the tradeoff between access and 
incentives.  On the one hand, giving authors a broader derivative use 
right increases the surplus captured by the author of the initial work, 
which in turn provides greater incentives to create copyrightable 
228 See Paul Goldstein, Derivate Rights and Derivative Works in Copyright, 30 J. COPY-
RIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 209, 217 (1983) (noting the possibility of market competition be-
tween an original novel and a transformative use with overlapping expressive content). 
229 See, e.g., Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (noting that copyright “must take ac-
count not only of harm to the original but also of harm to the market for derivative 
works”). 
230 510 U.S. at 593. 
231 Am. Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930; Princeton Univ. Press, 99 F.3d at 1387-88.  
Interestingly, the American Geophysical Union court noted the absence of a market for 
individual journal articles.  60 F.3d at 927.  The emergence of JSTOR, Science Direct, 
HeinOnline, and individual article sales through Amazon.com suggests that such mar-
kets are beginning to appear as well. 
232 As the American Geophysical Union court noted, “were a court automatically to 
conclude in every case that potential licensing revenues were impermissibly impaired 
simply because the secondary user did not pay a fee for the right to engage in the use, 
the fourth fair use factor would always favor the copyright holder.”  60 F.3d at 929 n.17.  
As a result, courts generally have placed some limits on the potential derivative mar-
kets that fall within the scope of the fourth statutory fair use factor.  See, e.g., Campbell,
510 U.S. at 592 (limiting consideration to markets for potential derivative uses “that 
creators of original works would in general develop or license others to develop”); Am.
Geophysical Union, 60 F.3d at 930 (limiting consideration to markets for potential de-
rivative uses that are “traditional, reasonable, or likely to be developed”). 
714 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 635
works.  On the other hand, a broader derivative use right limits the 
ability of follow-on authors to create new works.  The conventional 
approach would attempt to balance these considerations by permit-
ting follow-on works that include a significant contribution of addi-
tional creativity to fall outside the derivative use right.233
Shifting to an impure public goods perspective would counsel 
against such an outcome.  Strengthening the derivative use right 
would increase the incentive to create copyrightable works.  The 
greater incentive for entry would increase the number of close substi-
tutes with which each work competes.  The increase in competition 
would in turn foster the ability of follow-on authors to obtain access to 
the original work.  Under these circumstances, the original work 
would serve both as an input into another product and as an end 
product in its own right.  The literature on transfer pricing indicates 
that so long as all of the relevant markets are sufficiently competitive, 
when a good constitutes both an end product and an input into an-
other product, revenue and economic welfare are maximized if the 
producer charges the same price regardless of whether the good is 
sold as one or as the other.234
This suggests that, rather than promoting access by follow-on au-
thors directly by decreasing the scope of the derivative use right, it is 
possible to accomplish the same goals indirectly by promoting entry 
and allowing the ensuing increase in price competition to increase fol-
low-on authors’ ability to obtain access to the original work.  Again, at 
some point, the derivative use right may become so strong that it 
eventually induces excess entry.  Unlike under the conventional ap-
proach, such market failure is not endemic.  Moreover, any welfare 
losses from excess entry would be offset by the welfare gains from the 
increase in price competition, including those created by the addi-
tional follow-on expression made possible by the drop in price that 
follow-on authors must pay to obtain access to the original work. 
CONCLUSION
The conventional approach to the economics of copyright has 
created a key misunderstanding about the relevance of public good 
economics.  Framing the issues in terms of nonexcludability and zero 
233 See supra Part I.C.5. 
234 PAUL MILGROM & JOHN ROBERTS, ECONOMICS, ORGANIZATION AND MANAGE-
MENT 79-83 (1992). 
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marginal cost overshadows the true challenge posed by nonrivalry in 
consumption, which is the difficulty in getting consumers to reveal 
their true preferences implicit in the Samuelson condition. 
The conventional approach also obscures the relevance of the 
theory of impure public goods for copyright policy.  Framing nonri-
valry in terms of zero marginal cost causes impure public goods theory 
to appear relevant only when the purchase of an additional unit of a 
public good increases the costs borne by those who have already pur-
chased that good, an assumption that does not seem to hold for most 
copyrighted works.  The more fundamental approach to public good 
economics that I have proposed reveals how introducing variations in 
quality can turn a pure public good into an impure public good just as 
effectively as can variations in congestion cost.  Although this Article 
focuses primarily on one source of variation in quality—product dif-
ferentiation along a spectrum of product characteristics—one need 
not embrace any particular source of quality variation in order to ap-
preciate the significance of this insight. 
Thus, to the extent that public good economics has implications 
for copyright, it is through the theory of impure public goods rather 
than the theory of pure public goods.  The key difference is that, in 
sharp contrast to pure public goods, markets for impure public goods 
do not exhibit a systematic tendency toward underproduction and 
underutilization.  On the contrary, impure public goods are suscepti-
ble to efficient market production under a wide range of circum-
stances. 
Saying that markets can provide impure public goods efficiently 
does not necessarily mean that they will do so in every circumstance.  
Unlike private goods, impure public goods lack an “invisible hand” 
that steers market outcomes toward optimality.  Determining the best 
policy response thus depends upon a careful analysis of the underly-
ing empirics and the possible institutional solutions.  Even so, impure 
public goods equilibria have the advantage of not being bounded 
away from efficient outcomes.  Under an impure public goods ap-
proach, copyright policy is no longer an exercise in second-best out-
comes, but rather a more promising space in which near optimality 
may be a real possibility. 
